

CHAPTER SEVEN

OUTCOMES OF THE KSiPP

Introduction

The KSiPP project¹ straddled three African townships, accommodating 1.5 million people. Led by a relatively small group of coordinating consultants, the project effected delivery on time and within budget, of over three hundred projects to the value of R3,972.3 million in a five-year period (GPG, 1999a:44).

During its five-year lifespan, the project saw an impressive number of infrastructural improvements. There was the rehabilitation of engineering services – including sewerage, refuse removal, roads, storm water, rail, electricity and telephone lines throughout the area. Three new police stations were established, as well as twenty-three satellite police stations and an SOS Emergency Communication System, while sixty-eight patrol vehicles were purchased. Two thousand violence-damaged houses were repaired, and emergency services were provided to all informal settlements. Twelve thousand five hundred new houses were built, one hundred schools were improved, fifteen clinics repaired, and three sports stadiums upgraded. The project also saw the training of five hundred community constables in life-skills and of one hundred and twenty youths in hard-skills. At least in terms of quantifiable measures, the project seemed successful, despite some unevenness in implementation. The story is thus of a seemingly successful project, undertaken in a hugely complex political and institutional environment. A key report documenting the outcomes and lessons learnt from this project concluded that, “when the project was complete, the spiral of decline that had characterised these violent, deprived and impoverished areas had been arrested and the basis for sustainable urban life established” (Zack *et al.*, 2003:9).

¹ The content of this chapter is drawn from four evaluation reports of which I was the principal author. These are: a post facto evaluation undertaken at the point of completion of the KSiPP in 1999, on behalf of the Gauteng Provincial Government (GPG, 1999a); a retrospective and comparative evaluation of the Special Integrated Presidential Projects conducted for the South African Department of Housing by the CSIR (Zack, 2002); a report commissioned by GHK Consulting for the National Audit Office (England) as part of a series of comparative case studies of community regeneration in third world countries (Zack, 2003); and a report commissioned by the Gauteng Provincial Government on the lessons from the KSiPP that might inform urban regeneration initiatives (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

This chapter chronicles a detailed assessment of the project and places on record the empirical outcomes. It employs a narrative technique in the tradition of practice writing – as explained in Chapter Two. In this narrative, I am the storyteller. The narrative is thus influenced by my accounting of the story and by my role in selection and in foregrounding of different issues and details. Furthermore the chapter is, as explored in Chapter Two, filtered through my own involvement, both in academia and in practice, with the project, culminating in my use of the lenses of critical pragmatism in the next chapters. The present chapter traces the history and outcomes of the KSiPP, in order to detail the intentions of the project, planning processes and specific interventions leading to these outcomes. The relationship between intention and outcomes will be elaborated as the narrative unfolds. The content of this chapter is largely empirical and is drawn from the findings of professional evaluations discussed in Chapter Two. It is not interpretive beyond the findings of these evaluations. This is a conscious and necessary stepping stone to Chapter Eight and Chapter Nine, where the project is viewed through the lenses of critical pragmatism. This chapter, then, is juxtaposed against the following chapters to highlight the differences in approach between the application of a relatively conventional assessment of the KSiPP and the application of critical pragmatism.

The chapter is structured as follows. The first section discusses the motives behind the project: the desire to redress damage caused by violence in the 1980s, and to redevelop a critically neglected area. The chapter moves on to discuss the formation of a task group and the strategising behind the presidential project. The structures that drove the project, and the nature of the funding supporting it, are considered. Thereafter a broad analysis is undertaken of the workings of six functional areas: security; engineering; health, welfare and education; sport, recreation and business; housing; and communication. The measures employed to address issues in each functional area are evaluated, as are the process of project execution and the actual outcomes. A more detailed analysis is undertaken of one of the sub-projects within the housing portfolio, which sought to repair and redevelop housing destroyed by violence. The chapter concludes that the KSiPP achieved most, not all, of its objectives; but that it was a process fraught with complex and contradictory interests, plays of power, and tensions between process and delivery.

Motivation for a Presidential Project: Violence and Underdevelopment

The KSiPP initiative was conceived in a context of fragile consultations, emerging policy, and political positioning prior to the birth of the ‘new’ South Africa, and was to be one of the first steps taken by the new state. The project drew its inspiration and guidance from emerging national policy, as well as from the development discourses of the early 1990s. In fact, the foundation for the KSiPP had been laid prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections when former President De Klerk appointed the Kathorus Task Group (KTG) on 1 February 1994, in consultation with the national Transitional Executive Council (TEC), to take charge of the area. This foundation, in turn, rested on two years of intense work by the Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat in the area. As one informant recalled, “the National Peace Secretariat set the negotiating ground for talks about development to take place. The Peace structure spent hours sitting with all groups in the area, to forge peace talks. Key leaders worked tirelessly, Reverend Dandala, Thabani Dlamini of the IFP, Chris Dlamini of the ANC, and many others” (Interview: Kathorus peace officer (a), 1999).

The KSiPP was furthermore a direct response to devastating high-profile violence in this area in the pre-election period. During the late 1980s political, social, economic and criminal conflict enveloped these areas, with warring groups targeting and destroying each other’s homes, businesses and means of access to employment. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has subsequently identified the presence of a ‘third force’ of state-sanctioned police complicity in the violence, which further fuelled the devastation. Police inactivity in response to the violence removed the possibility of protection of people in what was effectively a war zone. And the power struggles were linked to parochial resource disputes – disputes that “turned political as the state or political parties (the ANC or IFP) became involved...” (Chipkin and Thulare, 1997). The links between violence and the dysfunctionality of the physical development of these areas are manifold. The history of concerted underinvestment in these areas as described in the previous chapter, created conditions of scarce resources and heightened conflict over access to the scant resources that did exist (Kynoch, 2004). The violence was, on the one hand, fuelled by inadequate physical conditions and limited social and economic development opportunities; on the other hand, the

violence made these conditions worse. What the violence did effectively achieve was to raise the political profile of these areas.

The founding interviews conducted for the various evaluative studies of the KSiPP provide a graphic account of the appalling conditions in the area when a planning process was instituted. Residents recall that in the early 1990s various social sectors were affected by conflict. Education was disrupted as schools became dysfunctional through arson and attack, and the involvement of the youth in the conflict. Housing was destroyed as township youth and hostel residents damaged homes and hostels, particularly in the Penduka area of Katlehong. Local retail all but shut down as shops were burnt down, and arson claimed all the buildings along Khumalo Street, the main road linking Thokoza and Katlehong and separating a hostel and private bonded housing area. The Kwesini line, a key rail link between Natalspruit station in Katlehong and the industrial areas, was closed after being physically uprooted by warring groups eager to control movement routes in the area. Consequently, industries in the nearby Alrode industrial area closed down and the factory owners fled. There was a complete collapse of infrastructural services as water and sanitation were overloaded – to the extent that four communal taps served between four thousand and five thousand shacks in Phola Park on the edge of Thokoza. People reported that if you opened the taps in the morning a little water would trickle out, after which there would be no water for the rest of the day. Roads were riddled with potholes; streetlights were not operating; shack settlements had almost no servicing. Diseases of poverty were rife, including respiratory ailments, gastro-intestinal problems, cancer, venereal diseases, tuberculosis and measles (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

Institutional Structures of the KSiPP

Peace Structures and the Lead Up to a Kathorus Task Group

The foundation for development lay in securing peace. Peace was widely recognised as a precondition for development (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 1999). One of the Kathorus peace officers, tasked in 1993 with liaising with all parties on the ground, provides an insightful account of the work done by peace structures of the early 1990s. His role was to provide an intense daily presence in the area, moving between groupings and negotiating with leadership, special defence units (SDUs) and

others. If he knew the situation was hostile, he would warn leaders. He remembers that the Peace Committee literally doused the flames of houses set alight.

This peace officer also recalls that it was recognised at an early stage that a substantial root cause of the conflict was underdevelopment:

When the Peace committee got to the point of striking agreements, groups would say that even if there was peace, there would still be problems. The peace committee was able to pressurise the authorities to intervene in development crises, for example to unblock sewers. There was an immediate link between interventions such as unblocking drains and peace: when a drain had been unblocked, and toilets were working, that area experienced an immediate period of peace. (Interview: Kathorus peace officer (b), 1999)

According to the peace officer, keeping the peace was nearly impossible. There would be a resolution for peace over an issue on one day, and the very next day an allegation of irregularity in the process would see the resolution overturned. However, the Peace Committee never gave up, working away at every small issue until it was resolved. The Committee reacted to the demands of the moment and would call in the leadership, talk to people of influence, and gradually chip away at problems. Negotiating peace was also about conferring with the component parts of the township that were at war. Talks were held with the taxi associations, with influential people afraid of coming out, and with the battle-weary residents of Phola Park. He (ibid.) claims that the residents “ultimately marched to the hostel to say they were tired of the fighting”.

The leading Kathorus trade unionist in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and currently mayor of Ekurhuleni, recalls that the outbreak of violence on 30 December 1990 marked the height of conflict in the Kathorus area. This episode in particular mobilised the community leaders, and on 5 February 1991 community representatives called for a peace process to be set in place. In April 1991, meetings were set up between the IFP and the ANC. But this was not merely a bilateral engagement. Business people from the key industrial area of Alrode, adjacent to Thokoza and a major employment hub for Kathorus, assisted in setting up the talks. By October 1991, there was a formal Peace Accord structure in the area. At the national level, the TEC – a representative body of key political and stakeholder interests – was set up as

a parallel structure to Parliament. Although violence in the area continued, peace structures monitored the violence and facilitated talks where possible.

In 1993, Kathorus residents marched to Kempton Park, headquarters of the national TEC. The march was sparked by allegations of police collusion in the violence in the area. The representatives were given a hearing at the TEC and a move towards establishing a task group was begun (Interview: Ekurhuleni mayor (current), 1999). The resulting KTG was established with a primary goal to “re-establish stability in the East Rand”. For this reason, the KTG included several high-profile military and police figures.²

Once peaceful elections had been achieved, the agenda moved swiftly towards development and to getting this project onto the national agenda for reconstruction and development. The then chairperson of the KTG (Interview: KTG chairperson, 1999) was advised to “get an RDP project going”. The trade union representative – later to become a Member of Parliament and then mayor of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council – was the KTG member who called on a leading planning consultant and ex-general manager of the Urban Foundation to assist the KTG in establishing a strategy for development. The planning consultant in turn advised the KTG chairperson to obtain a mandate and commitment from key politicians in provincial government. The KTG chairperson approached the Provincial Premier Sexwale, and the members of the executive council (MECs) for Education, Security and Housing. A mandate was secured, and housing and security MECs were tasked with providing backup to the KTG team.

Birth of the KSiPP and Immediate Delivery Focus

It is said that when the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Ministry opened its doors for the first time in 1994, the Kathorus representatives were there to hand in their business plan (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999). The business plan applied for R645.1 million via the RDP fund, and was granted the full amount. The KSiPP was launched on 22 October 1994 with the following goals – to

² These included Prof. Ben Turok – a recently returned political exile appointed as RDP Coordinator by the national RDP Ministry; retired SANDF Brigadier G. Kruys; C Dlamini – ANC; A. Mabalane – SANCO; G. Matthewson – Local Business; S. Mtshali – Hostel Association; G. Mzizi – IFP; T. Ndabeni – Peace Secretariat; D Nkosi – COSATU and M. Oberholzer – NP.

repair, rehabilitate and provide housing, security, social and engineering services in Kathorus so as to:

- ▶ establish a safe and secure environment where law and order is upheld by an effective police service;
- ▶ ensure the effective and ongoing provision of engineering services, with the target level for service provision being:
 - a secure and effective water connection to each stand,
 - wet sanitation or a flush toilet on each stand,
 - house to house refuse removal,
 - effective road accesses to every stand including tarred primary and secondary roads and gravel tertiary roads,
 - domestic electricity to each stand, and
 - telephone and postal services to each stand on demand;
- ▶ provide schools, libraries, adult education, clinics and hospital services that are at standards and levels that are found nationally in South Africa;
- ▶ provide recreational facilities within walking distance and in terms of the needs and priorities of each community;
- ▶ provide housing within the framework of the RDP to as many families as possible;
- ▶ provide access to safe and convenient public transport including rail, bus and taxis;
- ▶ ensure the effective administration of local government services with payments by residents of reasonable charges for acceptable services received; and
- ▶ promote the development of formal and informal business (GPG, 1999b).

According to the KTG chairperson:

There was a directive to get delivery within two weeks. The streetlights were immediately repaired. Getting things moving quickly required a lot of talking and negotiating. This had to happen from outside of the state to keep co-ordination going...we talked ourselves to pieces... (Interview: KTG chairperson, 1999)

The post-election mandate of the KTG was to address stability, reconstruction and development in the area. The mandate comprised of a three-stage approach: firstly, to secure a mandate to pursue a programme for stability, reconstruction and development in Kathorus and to secure funding; secondly, to define the overall

strategy, development programme and management structures for implementation; and thirdly, to implement this strategy and programme (KSPP, 1994a).

Under the guidance of a strategic consultant, the KTG formed three technical teams (KSPP, 1994a): an action area team to define smaller action areas for development; a reconstruction coordination team for engineering (utility) services, housing and social services; and a security coordination team, consisting of high-ranking military and police officers responsible for Kathorus, officials from the Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat, and an outside coordinator appointed by the KTG. The technical teams comprised representatives from the six local authorities of Katlehong, Thokoza, Vosloorus, Germiston, Alberton and Boksburg; the PWV Provincial Administration; the East Rand Regional Services Council (ERRSC); the South African Police Services (SAPS) and the South African National Defence Force (SANDF). The action area team in particular included community representatives. Stakeholder input was sought through invitations to meetings being extended to ‘non-statutory bodies’ (KSPP, 1994a). All planning proposals were also tested within community RDP forums, which included participants from all three spheres of government and from non-statutory structures such as civics, youth and women’s organisations. Furthermore, a Kathorus steering committee formalised input from the action area chairmen and representatives from each local authority.

Under the auspices of the KTG, consultants were called upon to identify the planning problems and project requirements within an eight-week period, and linked with local authority officials for the purpose. Project requirements were drawn up on the basis of the visible effects of violence and from a sector-by-sector analysis. Consultants and officials, within technical teams as described below, undertook this breakdown. They prepared a status quo report, prioritising the area’s normalisation, and the upgrading of engineering services. Notably, community structures endorsed the report’s findings.

Multi-level Institutional Arrangements

The plan was that KTG structures serving as transitional arrangements would in 1995 largely be set aside, as local government elections paved the way for permanent democratic structures at a local level. A team of consultants would then be appointed

to manage the development and implementation of the unfolding project. A set of institutional arrangements was established for the KSiPP, which linked all three spheres of government and incorporated the consultant team (Figure 7.1). This revised management structure, in fact, remained in place for much longer than envisaged – for the duration of the project until 1999.




Figure 7.1: Managerial Arrangements (Source: Napier and Rust, 2002)

At a national level, accountability for the SIPP programme fell initially under the Ministry without Portfolio (the RDP Ministry) and following the closure of this ministry, it came to fall under the Housing Ministry. In addition, a complex web of coordination was established at national level, with inter-departmental committees and vertical lines of coordination through all line departments.

At the provincial level, the Department of Housing and Land Affairs of the Gauteng Provincial Government assumed responsibility for overall project management of the KSiPP in 1995. The department appointed and managed the project team, reviewed and approved all project proposals and business plans. Furthermore, the Department of Housing and Land Affairs drew down the funds from central government and made payment against invoices submitted, reporting to national and provincial government on a monthly and annual basis on progress of the project (Zack *et al.*, 2003). The official charged with coordinating overall management of the KSiPP at a provincial level was the provincial housing department chief director.

It was decided that implementation of the KSiPP would be undertaken through local governments. In 1995, the institutionally separate African townships were incorporated into their respective white municipalities. This incorporation made Katlehong into a part of the Greater Germiston Transitional Local Council (TLC), as a single municipal entity. Similarly, Thokoza was drawn into the Greater Alberton TLC, and Vosloorus into the Greater Boksburg TLC. The role of local government was also radically re-conceptualised, with new powers devolved to municipal level. It is crucial to remember that the KSiPP was very much in its infancy at this stage, when local government structures were still being formulated in line with the new post-apartheid state. For this purpose, each local authority established an RDP department, responsible for managing the activities of the action area coordinators, as well as all RDP activities within those local authorities.

The then MEC for Housing in the provincial government, appointed a project manager to establish a consulting team, in order to implement the KSiPP business plan. The KSiPP project manager was a political activist, development specialist and prominent figure in ANC political circles. As project manager, he reported to the MEC, but also connected closely with the three local governments involved in the project. He was also tasked with stakeholder liaison, conflict management and strategic leadership – reporting on a regular basis to all spheres of government, particularly local government. A project office was established for administrative functions and as a point of direct liaison with community members.

The team to ensure the project's implementation was appointed through a tender process at the end of 1994 – on an annual contract to be reviewed, and subsequently renewed on the basis of performance. The project team's role was to monitor, coordinate, facilitate and in some cases, implement the project. The team leader, a planner and housing specialist who had worked in the Urban Foundation, was responsible for the team members' activities. His responsibilities included reviewing all business plans and project proposals received and submitting them for approval to provincial government, and administering and consolidating all invoices and making payments to project team members. He was also called upon to coordinate team members' activities, to make proposals as to the project's strategic focus, and to ensure the continued implementation of the project in terms of the agreed business plans.

Six functional coordinators reported to the team leader, each responsible for a different aspect of the project: security; engineering; health, welfare and education; sport, recreation and business; housing; and communication. Each functional coordinator was required to coordinate with all relevant stakeholders in their functional areas to identify projects that should be undertaken and to identify appropriate implementers in each case.

In addition to the consultant project team, a strategic team, headed by a strategic consultant, operated for the first few months of the KSiPP. The strategic team's intention was to get beyond the purely sectoral issues to the broad problems plaguing projects, such as relationships between the project team and officials, and issues of participation. This team brainstormed and strategised on ways to address issues that uniformly faced projects. It was disbanded in 1996, apparently because of personal tensions between the strategic consultant and the provincial housing chief director (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999).

Strategising and Funding the KSiPP

Simplifying the Complex Problem: A Four-Phase Strategy for Implementation

A broad strategy, established in the October 1994 business plan, formed the foundation of the implementation approach. This strategy defined four stages for implementation:

- ▶ Phase One: Secure Health and Safety (October – December 1994)
- ▶ Phase Two: Repair, Consolidate and Maintain (January – December 1995)
- ▶ Phase Three: Upgrade (January 1995 – June 1999)
- ▶ Phase Four: Develop Additional/New Infrastructure.

Each stage secured the conditions necessary in order for the following stage to operate. Within this framework each so-called ‘functional area’ was then required to define its own objectives and programmes within this four-phased strategy. These phases guided the implementation throughout the life of the project.

By way of illustration, the application of this four-phased framework to housing worked as follows: Phase one dealt with urgent needs. It was meant to secure basic health and safety in Kathorus, and focused on the installation and reinstatement of emergency services to hostels and informal settlements. A programme to repair violence-damaged houses was initiated during this phase. Phase two was intended to upgrade damaged housing, and focused on repairs to the violence-damaged houses and the rehabilitation of the hostels. Phase three addressed the conditions of those in the most deprived living circumstances, focusing mainly on the upgrading of hostels and informal settlements. Phase four concentrated on improving housing conditions – generally through the delivery of new housing, in order to reduce overcrowding in existing structures. The regulation of tenant-landlord relationships in the informal rentals sector was also to be addressed during this final phase.

Financing the KSiPP

As an initial investment, SiPPs projects were allocated funding from the RDP Fund. The money was intended to stimulate further investment from national, provincial, and local government; from the private sector, and from donor sources. The funding for these urban renewal projects was ring-fenced, or secured in a dedicated fund. This ensured certainty on a planning level, as a given sum of money would be kept

available for urban reconstruction projects – and a holistic budgeting process could be determined upfront. It was further intended that the separation of these funds from ordinary line-function would foster integration across different functional areas. Since these areas relied on the same money pot, distribution across all sectors would necessitate negotiation. The RDP provided all SiPPs funding on condition that provincial line function departments and municipalities provided matching funds from their budgets and carried all recurrent costs.

In addition to the R645.1 million received from the RDP Fund, the KSiPP geared in a further R2,411.5 million from other state sources, thus availing R3,056.6 million to the project over five years. Including escalation over the five-year period, this amounted to R3,972.3 million – close to R4 billion.

Structuring Community Involvement through Development Forums and Action Committees

When the KSiPP was initiated, social capital in Kathorus was at an all-time low. People were marginalised from formal government and economic activity. Within a context of general neglect, residents were either passive or angry recipients of top-down government projects (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

The KSiPP intended to change the status quo. RDP principles required that the project encourage active community participation in the development process. The KSiPP was also intent on using the process of implementation to deliver multiple outcomes. This meant that every project would be used as an opportunity not just to deliver physical infrastructure, but also to enhance social capital. A storm water management project would seek not only to provide storm water pipes, but also to train contractors and so to create jobs. The prospect of building community through project delivery was hopeful but daunting, each functional coordinator being confronted with the overwhelming question, “How do you involve a community of 1.5 million people in a project?” (Interview: KSiPP communications coordinator, 1999).

The project manager suggests that in the early days of the KSiPP,

... there was a mismatch between community expectations of how and what the RDP would deliver and the mandate of the project. Community based organisations anticipated that money would flow through their structures. There was an expectation that popular decision making, in mass meetings, would prevail.” (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999)

This was not to happen. Instead, community-level involvement was to be directed through consultative structures. Local development forums, established in Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, were intended as focal points for interfacing between the project management team, the authorities and civil society. These forums comprised representatives of local government, community organisations and professional consultants (Zack *et al.*, 2003). Each township was further divided into geographical zones, in which twenty-eight local action area committees were established as the link between the projects and local residents. As new local government structures took hold in November 1995, ward committees became influential forums for exchange between councillors and their constituencies. In many cases the representatives on action area committees later became ward committee members. The implications of this participatory structuring are discussed in terms of power relations in the following chapter.

Project Monitoring

Implementation through Parallel Structures within a Strong Core

Although the project was executed through different functional areas, these were closely held together. In the first instance the overriding responsibility centred on the consultant team leader. The centrality of the project manager was crucial in maintaining similar procedures and communication across the different functional areas. Most important, however, was the monitoring of the project through extremely regular deliberations. Indeed, the project management team met once a week for five years to keep the process under close supervision, which ensured an ongoing scrutiny of strategic, functional and project issues, thus serving a major monitoring function (GPG, 1999a).

While detailed project supervision was managed through project meetings, as was the sharing of information between consultants, an objective and external monitoring process was not sustained. In the early years of the project, the project management team held a series of quarterly workshops to evaluate the strategic direction of the KSiPP. These team workshop sessions occurred for several months into the project and were considered most useful by the project coordinators. The workshops provided a forum for sharing ideas and for gaining a perspective that was broader than that possible within intense delivery-led projects. They also allowed the team to interact with development expertise.

Outcomes in Six Functional Areas

A summary of the key projects, as extracted from that report, is outlined in Appendix One. What follows below is a broad discussion of the scale of problems in each functional area, the measures employed to address these, the process of project execution and the outcomes of each functional area. Detailed objectives of each functional area are listed in Appendix Two.

Engineering Services: Large Scale Efficient Delivery at High Speed

Assessments of infrastructure in Kathorus found that bulk services for water, sewerage and electricity were generally sufficient for existing developments. Yet, what was required was the upgrading of most of the internal water, waterborne sewerage and electricity networks throughout Kathorus – due to years of neglect. Natural deterioration had taken place due to aging, and there had simply been insufficient funds for maintenance. The small, forty year-old galvanised pipes that had been installed mid-block were leading to massive water losses through leaking. Sewerage pump stations were in a state of disrepair owing to sabotage. Given the flat terrain and poor drainage, the pump stations were essential to the functioning of the sewerage system. To make matters worse, the lack of preventive maintenance had led to degradation of pipes and to subsidyn, probably due to the dolomitic subsoil conditions. Electricity networks in all three areas had been severely abused and sabotaged during the era of insurrection and rent boycotts, and theft of equipment remained a problem. The broad task of the engineering services functional area was

thus to upgrade internal services. Detailed objectives were prepared for each service in all areas, and are summarised in Appendix Two.

At a rate of one hundred and sixty four individual projects over five years, the engineering functional area epitomised high-speed delivery in the KSiPP. The implementation of infrastructure investment was programmed with precision, as only six projects were not completed at the end of the five-year programme. The scale of infrastructure delivered, the extent of training provided, the jobs created and the policy and administrative – as well as structural – influence achieved by the project was extensive (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

The engineering functional area consumed a substantially larger portion of the original RDP budget than did any other functional area. This uneven distribution of funds did not go uncontested within the consulting team. Yet in their design, execution and even in their reception by beneficiaries, the services delivered through the engineering functional team were probably the least controversial. Focus group residents surely provided the most vivid image of improvement. In 1994 when they opened their taps in the morning there would be a mere trickle, followed by no water for the rest of the day. If they were, however, to turn on their taps in 1999, after the KSiPP was instituted, water would freely flow at any time of day or night.

In deciding on the levels of service to be installed in Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus, consultants and officials considered the cost of initial capital. They further evaluated the level of existing service, as opposed to politically acceptable levels. Finally, consultants calculated the ongoing costs of maintenance. Of paramount importance in the choice of service levels was the issue of ‘redress’. It was acknowledged that these areas had been historically deprived, and that local residents of the Kathorus project area would therefore not accept a lower level of service than existed in the then neighbouring white areas. Similar service levels were thus provided in the majority of cases (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

The execution of projects was largely unproblematic. Within the engineering sector, the officials and departments of the traditionally white municipalities were experienced in the delivery of the services required. Engineering may have been

operating at an unprecedented scale in terms of the nature of repairs and the speed of delivery required, but its functions were components of normal engineering work. Overall, projects were well managed and systems either existed or were created to effect the implementation of programmes.

Notably, the actual process of construction was an unrivalled opportunity to create jobs. The KSiPP was intent on harnessing this opportunity through encouraging labour-intensive construction on large-scale projects where possible. Moreover, many projects specifically stipulated the employment of local businesses – such as emerging contractors and small, medium and micro enterprises (SMMEs). Over two hundred local contractors were trained in a contractor development programme and over one thousand three hundred people received training in construction through the implementation of projects. Overall, approximately 475,000 person days in work opportunities were created through the programme (GPG, 1999a).

Evaluation reports found that the functional coordinators for engineering services generally performed an excellent service. They maintained good technical records; produced comprehensive monthly financial reports; kept track of expenditure, and assisted in resolving technical and financial problems between stakeholders. Furthermore, these coordinators paid serious attention to the maintenance aspects of engineering infrastructure, serving to sustain the impact of interventions. The Ekurhuleni chief engineer confirmed that in addition to rehabilitation work, there were some extensions to the internal services network, as well as the bulk services (Interview: Ekurhuleni chief engineer, 1999). These extensions clearly increased the councils' maintenance requirements. Having said this, the majority of projects reduced the maintenance requirements by improving service standards, negating the effects of ageing, and also by deliberate maintenance-friendly designs. Furthermore, each project implemented under the KSiPP required the approval of councils, including a commitment to the ongoing maintenance of infrastructure provided.

The ongoing sustainability of infrastructural interventions relies on costs recovery. In this respect, evaluations found that levels of recovery have been extremely poor. Even in cases such as Vosloorus, where campaigns to increase levels of service payment by residents had been highly successful during the period of the KSiPP, funds collected

have been insufficient to support costs. Total monies collected have certainly improved, which can be attributed to a combination of factors – including increases in service charges. Nevertheless, “arrears have increased to alarming proportions and a turn around is not in sight” (GPG, 1999a).

This analysis was regarded as fairly representative for the Kathorus area. The conclusion drawn was that it was unlikely that local authorities would be able to undertake more than essential maintenance in the future – unless additional capital injection was provided (GPG, 1999a).

Security: Policing, Privatised Security and Communications to Lay Preconditions for Development

A major concern of the Kathorus project was to ‘normalise’ the area in terms of safety for residents. Over and above political violence discussed in Chapter Six, crime was also a serious problem. The level of crime was ascribed to large numbers of illegal firearms in the community and the activities of dissidents within the SDUs and special protection units (SPUs). The presence of illegal immigrants was also seen as contributing to crime, although this has never been substantiated (Oelofse in GPG, 1999a).

Thirty-four individual security projects were undertaken over the five-year implementation period. Key amongst these was an SOS emergency communication system – together with effective policing, emergency services, and the Kathorus Security and Protection Service. Police stations and a child-protection unit were also deemed crucial to the five-year plan.

The SOS emergency communication system allowed residents of the community to phone for help, free of charge, in the event of a crime or other emergency. Sixty telephones and three communication centres were installed in the area to support this system. The system had an even wider impact by prompting the local councils to deliver more comprehensive and upgraded communications systems within Kathorus. The SOS system was never intended to be a long-term project and it had a short life span of about five years. It is unlikely that this would have been a sustainable service, as many of the SOS units were vandalised. Councillors ascribed this to “a lack of

proper training in terms of use by the community”. Others interviewed noted that there were general operation and maintenance problems, and one consultant commented that “... the technology was too attractive, the points too isolated, and they were easily targeted by theft” (Interview: KSiPP security coordinator, 2003 for Zack *et al.*, 2003).

In an effort to combat crime, twenty-three satellite police stations were established throughout Kathorus. These satellite stations were closed, apparently because they became redundant, “because of the normalisation of the area” (Interview: KSiPP security coordinator, 1999). But possibly this was not the only reason; during the life of the project several of these satellite stations were targeted for theft and violent crime against the police or community constables. New police stations were built in Zonkizizwe, Katlehong and Thokoza. A child-protection unit was established and the SAPS Investigative Service Unit was re-instituted in Kathorus. This service had grown with the development of a comprehensive counselling service attached to the Natalspruit Hospital subsequent to the KSiPP (GPG, 1999b).

By 1999, all emergency services were operational in the area – including ambulance, fire, traffic and other emergency services. These services were still providing effective services in 2003. In addition, what was by then the Ekurhuleni council was implementing the concept of ‘one stop’ Customer Care Centres, integrating the response arm of emergency services.

In order to provide protection to contractors working in Kathorus, over seven hundred persons were employed on the various projects as security personnel. This service was expected to continue after the closure of the Kathorus project. Indeed, the service carried over, although in a different guise. Transformed into a private security company, Vukani Security still operated in the area in 2003 and the KSiPP project manager and the KSiPP security coordinator continued as shareholders in the company.

An evaluation of the Kathorus area in 2003 established the extent to which the KSiPP programme helped create safer living conditions. Statistics showed that Thokoza, which in the late 1980s and early 1990s was the scene of major conflicts and very

much a 'no-go' area, in 2003 had lower crime levels than both Katlehong and Vosloorus. However, the report also indicated that in 2003 a high proportion of property crimes occurred in the areas that once constituted the most damaged parts of Kathorus. The evaluation suggested that the very areas significantly improved through KSiPP interventions now attracted property crime, precisely because these areas accommodate residents with more expensive lifestyles. This shift from crimes of violence – such as rape, murder, assault and grievous bodily harm – to property crimes – such as burglary and motor vehicle theft – nonetheless does reflect a general improvement in the crime situation.

A spatial mapping of crime statistics shows an interesting link between development and crime. Parts of Kathorus remain dangerous spaces, namely the un-maintained or undeveloped public open spaces – tracts of vacant land, as well as the designated parks and the floodplains. The incidence of crime is also high in informal settlements. High population densities, combined with inadequate services like roads, signage and storm-water drainage, were said to contribute to increased crime opportunities and to limit the efforts of security forces to patrol and respond within these areas (Landman in Zack *et al.*, 2003).

While crime statistics in the area remain high – indeed on a par with national levels – people's perceptions of the area have changed considerably. Perceptions certainly play a pivotal role in affecting peoples' feelings of safety, their use of the urban environment and the level of investment confidence in the area. Residents interviewed in February 2003 believed that the various safety and security interventions played a crucial part in stabilising the area. All those interviewed agreed that there are no longer 'no-go' areas and that people can generally move more freely and make use of the urban areas with less fear of violence. The area is considered relatively calm and the general view is that it has been significantly 'ordered' through various project interventions.

Finally, relations between the police and the community were found to have improved to the extent that in 2003 they were working together to address crime problems. Residents participate actively in community policing forums, particularly in Vosloorus. Improved facilities, including additional police stations and additional

resources, were deemed to have gone a long way to assist with crime prevention initiatives (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

Housing: Physical Interventions Ahead of Integration and Equity

The housing situation for 1.5 million people in Kathorus, which confronted the Special Presidential Project, was in some respects no different from that in many townships throughout South Africa. New private sector developments were available to the better-off, whilst the poor had to put up with an array of make-shift solutions – being housed in old public sector housing stock, squatter settlements or backyard shacks. Some of the poor were put up in site and service schemes or in starter houses supplied under the new government’s housing subsidy scheme. Many were housed in hostels in appalling conditions. What made Kathorus different was that the violence had led to the destruction of hundreds of homes in certain areas, and new developments were hampered by a lack of funding and security.

In 1994 it was estimated that there were 51,867 formal housing units; 18,969 informal housing units – including those in site and service schemes; and 28,498 hostel beds in Kathorus – accommodating anything up to 45,000 people (KSPP, 1994b). A survey in 1998 estimated that there were almost 31,000 backyard shacks in the area (KSPP 1994a). Thus, when the KSIPP was initiated in 1994, Kathorus was facing a severe housing shortage. The destruction of houses and hostels during the urban wars only exacerbated this shortage (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

It is worth noting the intentions of the housing portfolio in full, since they are unusually wide-ranging and ambitious. The stated aim of the housing portfolio was “to provide within the framework of the RDP acceptable structures to as many families as possible with particular emphasis on the following priority areas:

- ▶ upgrading and (where necessary) relocating informal settlements;
- ▶ upgrading hostels in order to make them habitable;
- ▶ repairing and redeveloping housing destroyed by violence; and
- ▶ improving rental conditions and access to services for sub-tenants” (KSPP, 1994a).

Indeed, fifty-two individual housing projects were accordingly undertaken over the five-year implementation period. Appendix One details the achievements of these

projects – including extensive repairs to violence damaged housing, and the provision of emergency services to informal settlements and several hostels. There was also the redevelopment of a key informal settlement (Phola Park) into formalised housing, the coordination of several new housing projects, and the establishment of a housing support centre and the development of a housing strategy for the region. However, the appendix does not document either the gap between the stated intentions and the actual outcomes, or the failure of several projects. It is essential to consider these disparities between intention and outcome, and to acknowledge the projects that did not reach fruition, if one is to provide an accurate evaluation of the housing projects.

In terms of achieving their objectives, it is clear that the housing projects that focused on physical delivery fared better than did the strategic programmes, which required cooperation between the three local authorities. For example, upgrading of several informal settlements did take place, although in some cases it was partial rather than complete. Related to the upgrading was the delivery of new housing – the aim of which was to provide alternative housing for those overcrowded in existing housing units. In practice, however, these projects also helped accommodate people who had been evicted from the houses of displacees, as well as former hostel residents and their families. The provision of alternative accommodation helped to create peace and stability. However, given the extent of need, a surprisingly small budget was allocated to the upgrading of hostels, which accommodated an equally marginalised community living in appalling circumstances. In addition, there is a glaring bias toward the repair of damaged housing projects – a project that warrants further analysis, given its politically charged nature and the fact that it was so seminal to the KSiPP project as a whole. A detailed sketch of this project and its outcomes is warranted to show the complexity of some of the individual projects undertaken within the KSiPP, but importantly, to highlight the choices taken by professionals in the politically charged context in which they operated.

Sketch of ‘Repair and Redevelopment of Housing Destroyed by Violence’ Sub-Project

Although it was anticipated to affect less than 1,000 dwellings, the cost, scale, complexity and politicised nature of this programme made it a key project in KSiPP. The project’s motivation was patently political: both to upgrade and to unite a divided community. About six hundred of the legitimate owners or tenants of houses damaged

during the Kathorus violence of 1994 had abandoned these and fled the violence – or been forced to move. Their houses were often vandalised or illegally occupied – usually both. Community consultation had found that repairs to violence-damaged houses and the return of displaced people were priorities if the area was to be stabilised (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999). The Displacees' Committees assumed a critical role in promoting the cause of displacees and the repair of their houses. These committees represented both ANC and IFP affiliated displacees, and had been campaigning tirelessly but unsuccessfully for their return for some time.

The technical, human and political aspects of the project were complex. In technical terms the following issues plagued delivery: Setting criteria for upgrading and undertaking a survey to determine the extent of the damage to houses was complicated. It was difficult to find owners and identify which houses were covered by insurance. Complex administrative structures were set up: a Damaged Housing Commission to evaluate and approve claims; a project manager; engineering consultants to implement repairs through a contractor programme, and a Steering Committee for each action area. In addition, systems were set up to process claims and carry out repairs; and alternative, temporary accommodation was provided for those whose houses were to be repaired. Displacees' Committees, one of the main vehicles for community participation, were responsible for collecting the names and addresses of displaced people who wanted to claim support. In addition, Action Area Committees were requested to guarantee the safety of displaced people returning to their former homes. The Home Loan Guarantee Company (HLGC) provided administrative oversight for claims.

The project was to start immediately at the end of 1994 and to be completed by December 1995. However, this deadline was extended several times and at the end of the KSiPP in 1999 the project was still not complete. In fact, an evaluation in 2003 found that there were still outstanding claims and continuing costs on the project (Zack *et al.*, 2003). The original idea was for the repairs to cost no more per house than the R15,000 level of the government's national housing capital subsidy (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999). However, this principle did not hold, and estimates increased to around R22,700 on average per house. More violence-

damaged houses were identified as the process moved forward, and the number of claims reached 2,643 – meaning that expenditure mushroomed (GPG, 1999a).

The average value of repairs is reported differently by different sources. The lowest was reported in 1997 as being R26,500 per unit and in the same year the highest estimated average value per house repaired was R33,376 – and a figure as high as R32,258 was reported in February 1999 (GPG, 1999a). Whatever the final figures, the cost of repairing a single house was clearly much higher than the R22,700 originally budgeted for in the October 1994 Business Plan. The reasons put forward were that no provision had been originally made for security, or for the need to adhere to new regulations concerning electricity reticulation within houses.

Concerns were raised over the project's high management and administration costs. These amounted to 14 per cent of the total project expenditure by February 1999, far exceeding the average management fee of 3.4 per cent in the KSiPP as a whole (GPG, 1999a). The evaluation found that the engineering consultancy had earned R7 million as the construction managers – an effective fee of R3,500 per house (GPG, 1999a). In defence of their inordinately high fees, the managers pointed out that the process of managing repairs was extremely demanding. For example, they had to process the more than 70,000 tenders, and over 4,500 payment certificates issued. At peak level, there were twenty-five claims per week for repairs. Over three million photocopies were made to produce tender documentation. The processing of claims also relied on deeds office records. There were frequent information delays and even cases of forged site permits or local authority tenancy records.

The human and political issues were also complex. A snapshot survey sufficed for the initial identification of violence-damaged houses, but the process later relied on individuals making claims in response to advertisements. Displacees' Committees also encouraged people to lay claims. In order to verify claims the HLGC had to interview claimants – the process of which far exceeded an administrative task. Claimants were required to describe precisely how it was that their houses came to be damaged through violence. This provided many claimants with their first opportunity to talk to someone about their terrifying ordeal. There was clearly a desperate need for

qualified people to provide trauma counselling at this point, but none could be provided (GPG, 1999a).

The eviction of illegal tenants from properties in order that repairs could take place, proved extremely problematical. In some cases, repairs took place without eviction, and illegal occupants stole materials or even went so far as to damage houses. In other cases, legitimate owners claimed for repairs but then illegal occupants moved back into houses. Negotiation processes with illegal occupants were slow and cumbersome. When eviction was finally initiated, it was resisted in court – prompting further delays. When large-scale evictions took place in April 1997, many houses were vandalised, and as many as one hundred houses had to be repaired a second time. Many legitimate owners remained fearful of returning to their homes unless evicted people had been removed from the neighbourhood. For their part, illegal occupants refused to move unless provided with alternative accommodation – for which the KSiPP needed to make arrangements.

In the complicated process, opportunists found loopholes. There were cases where building contractors and homeowners colluded, and even cases where owners ‘stole’ their own building materials, or further damaged houses in order to increase the extent of repairs.

Failure of Other Planned Housing Projects

Several other intended housing projects were only partially achieved. For example, the long-term aim of upgrading and converting the existing hostels into satisfactory accommodation for individuals or families was not achieved. The programme to provide emergency services to informal settlements in the short-term was partially realised, although in some cases funds had to be used to relocate residents to more suitable locations. In the planned housing support programme, a number of housing support centres were initially envisaged, but only one was created through the KSiPP – representing a significant scaling down of the original aims. Also abandoned was an intended special-purpose housing vehicle, which was to have focused on housing for the aged, people with physical or intellectual disabilities and homeless children. A project intended to help shack-dwellers access consolidation subsidies, or funds for improving their housing conditions, was similarly never established. Finally, while a

Kathorus sub-regional housing strategy was prepared during the project, it was not implemented. The following chapter examines the institutional factors that impacted on the failure of the housing projects which required the three local authorities could coordinate their various activities.

Oelofse's analysis of the housing budget undertaken for the KSiPP evaluation in 1999 notes that the budget was around R42 million in 1997. By February 1999, total expenditure was around R85 million, with the bulk of expenditure used for the repair of violence damaged houses, at just over R67 million (GPG, 1999a).

While there has been praise for several of the housing projects, officials' views of the KSiPP housing programme are not universally positive. For example, officials interviewed in 2003 lamented the fact that the housing backlog has not been reduced and that the strategic projects to address housing issues and long-term planning were never implemented. This was considered a serious omission. In a report reviewing the IDP for Ekurhuleni, 2002, it was claimed that there were 62,422 informal housing units in the Alberton, Boksburg, Germiston region – compared to an estimate of 18,969 for Kathorus in 1994. A housing official bemoaned, "... we now have more shacks than ever before" (Interview: Alberton, Germiston, Boksburg housing officials, 2002).

Social Services: Slow Processes, Weak and Rival Institutions, Meaningful Delivery

General Overview of Social Services Portfolio

In 1994, the provision of social services in the Kathorus area was deemed to be in crisis for two reasons. First, the paucity of infrastructure and dilapidated state of equipment, infrastructure and buildings rendered services in a critical condition. The second reason for the crisis in social services was that the roles of various players within the public and private sectors were poorly defined and were un-coordinated (GPG, 1999a). In terms of sheer numbers, the facilities required to bring basic social services in line with national norms were vast: it was estimated that one hundred and forty-two new primary schools, seventy-one secondary schools and seven new clinics would be required (GPG, 1999a).

This functional area of social services was responsible for education, health, welfare, women, and youth. The portfolio's original objectives, as outlined in the October 1994 business plan, went well beyond the delivery of services. In this, the portfolio of social services was significantly different from the security, housing and engineering portfolios.

The overall approach to development within this portfolio was to focus on finding an appropriate balance between deploying resources that would bring about immediate and visible improvements in services to the community, and devoting resources to a capacity building process that would facilitate the building of effective social service management capacity at the local level, so as to ensure the effective delivery of resources and programmes in the longer term (KSPP, 1994a). In addition, the programme aimed at rationalising roles and responsibilities of the many implementing agents within the social service sector – including both state and non-governmental delivery agents. The primary aim was to promote a partnership within the social services functional area between the state and non-governmental organisation (NGO) sectors.

In line with the overall focus on delivery in the KSPP (Overview and Lessons Learnt, March 1999) it was deemed necessary that the improvement of services be immediately visible to the community. Social consultants understood that visible service provision would, however, only partially meet the area's social service needs. The delivery of effective social services was considered a function not only of the operational environment, but also of the integration of human resources from various institutions. In a field where all levels of government agencies played a role in providing services or subsidies, and where NGOs in fact provided the majority of social services, effective coordination of roles would be critical.

As detailed project planning was initiated, the social services coordinators motivated for a detailed needs assessment prior to the development of action plans. The overall project leader rejected this approach, calling for a more delivery-focused approach that would yield immediate visible improvements. It was decided within the social services functional area to place the emphasis on rehabilitating and supporting existing amenities and on the rapid delivery of new facilities (Interviews: KSIPP

strategic consultant; social services coordinator, 1999). Thus, the social services functional area was drawn into dealing with existing relationships between authorities and stakeholders. In this arena the project could not exert control, although it did have the leverage of the Presidential Project. What was then already a daunting task was complicated by the duplication, extreme rivalry and under-capacity of the institutional structures serving social services.

Indeed, a number of institutional difficulties arose through the implementation of social services. The three local authorities saw themselves as very distinct. Originally the social services functional committee was the venue for discussing new projects in all areas. However, the inability of local authorities to see a way of working together led to the coordinators dealing with each authority separately, and using the functional committee as a forum for building links and sharing experiences. This reliance on the functional committee as an arena to build alliances substantially increased the workload of the project management team. It also made mere rhetoric of the talk in functional meetings of issues of integration and coordination between the local authorities. Officials commented, however, that they were indeed able to advise one another and to establish relationships. These alliances were forged among officials, despite the fact that disputes arose between the three local authorities about the location of specific projects – including the community health centres, the child and family centre and the women’s shelter.

Basic management for social services was weak and even non-existent. The functional coordinator noted, for example, that the Welfare department lacked systems to “make things move” or “get the community involved” (Interview: KSIPP social services coordinator, 1999). As a result, the involvement of communities and politicians in projects was uncoordinated. There was no mediating framework to direct choices, so at times stakeholders treated processes with considerable liberty – based on their own personal agendas. The Welfare department’s image within the community is one of incompetence, and the department has indeed not managed to change this perception through effective service to the poor. Social work functions such as the removal of threatened children to places of safety have been taken over by NGOs, by agreement or otherwise, since the Welfare department has been

inadequately resourced to take on this function – which often requires work after hours (Interview: Katlehong psychologist, 1999).

At the local authority level, the social services portfolio has had to deal with council health/social services departments, perceived as marginalised units in the local authority, with little capacity. Moreover, in the main, officials from previously black local authorities have staffed the social services departments. Not only did these departments have a short history of operating within the larger municipality, but they were burdened with a political baggage in that the officials concerned had been perceived as “sell-outs” (Interview: Boksburg housing official, 1999). The situation has been further complicated by the fact that local boundaries vary for health and education, and do not correspond with local authority boundaries. Nor do these service providers consider Kathorus as a region *per se* – given that the area was artificially defined for the purposes of the project.

In spite of the important emphasis on process, the social services functional area did achieve a substantial amount of physical construction, and the repairs to buildings and facilities did indeed provide visible improvements in the area. This portfolio’s tangible delivery did, as much as anything, raise the levels of enthusiasm for projects – for instance on the part of council officials (GPG, 1999a).

The pace of delivery increased rapidly in the latter half of 1997, an indication of the long lead-time required in projects that are socially focused or specific to the locale – given that complex consultation needs to take place with communities and stakeholders. The relatively rapid delivery thereafter testified to the smooth systems and relationships that had been affected through arduous negotiations in the first years. The functional coordinator identified the KSiPP team leader’s steering role as having been invaluable – in that he had maintained a relentless focus on delivery.

What follows are broad sketches of the health, education and welfare programmes within social development – which further illustrate the processes and outcomes within this functional area.

Health

Notwithstanding significant institutional challenges in this area, a large number of interventions were implemented. Fifteen clinics were repaired or extended and there was the purchase of two mobile clinics, which would together serve more than 100,000 families a year. Four new clinics were built, as were three large community health centres, which provide casualty and primary health care facilities.

The impact of the KSiPP health initiatives on the health of the community has been significant. Clinic staff members report that there has been a decrease in the level of ailments such as gastro, malnutrition and sexual transmitted diseases (Interview: Alberton health department officials (b) and (c), 2003). This is a testament to programmes that increased health awareness and to the provision of supplements to medication made available by the provincial health department.

A dramatic increase in the number of patients passing through the medical system reflects a reduction in queuing time, as more facilities and staff serve the area. According to the head of Health Services for the Alberton Town Council the 2003 statistics for patients seen per month range from 3,000 to 5,000, depending on the size of the facility (Interview: Alberton health department official (a), 2003). Improved referral systems and quality of services at local clinics encourage users to first seek help there, before proceeding to the regional Natalspruit hospital on referral. Interviews and inspections conducted in 2003 reveal that since the conclusion of the KSiPP, the work of Kathorus clinics has expanded to cover a broad spectrum of primary health care and curative services – as opposed to the purely preventative services rendered previously. New services include antenatal clinics, chronic illness, and diabetics – over and above those offered initially, such as child health, immunisation, family planning and treatment of minor ailments. The inspections revealed too that the Phola Park Community Centre was in a process of incorporating rehabilitation services, and that it also hosts related community projects. A volunteer women's group is involved in the cleaning of clinics and schools in the Kathorus area, with the long-term goal of being economically self-reliant. Another group manages an income-generating vegetable garden, the produce from which is sold to clinic patients and staff. As in other community health centres, there is a community health committee comprising of the facility manager, councillors, an environmental officer,

social worker and community members representing civil society structures in the area. Their roles include monitoring and following up health, environmental and community issues, promoting health campaigns and conducting health awareness at schools.

Regrettably, however, the physical placement of new clinics incurred high costs that arguably could have been better used in order to create more facilities or to cover other more pressing needs. A commissioned study concluded that two health centres were required for the Kathorus area. Extreme rivalry between the local authorities for resources led to the surprising decision to establish not two but three health centres – one in each local authority. Furthermore, the high quality of clinics developed was the subject of debate as the social services sector was criticised for – as the facility manager of Phola Park Community Health Centre suggests – “building Rolls Royces rather than developing a greater number of low quality facilities” (Interview: Alberton health department official (b), 2003). Consultants, on the other hand, argued that the KSiPP was duty-bound to provide high quality infrastructure in order to redress these historically deprived communities. Finally, the durability of health services also depends on budget allocation for increased staffing at upgraded facilities. While staffing levels have improved to some extent since the start of the KSiPP, overall staff levels remained problematic in 2003. This had resulted in a lack of personnel to operate some of the equipment provided by the KSiPP – including x-ray machinery, oral health facilities and an obstetrics and maternal health department.

Welfare

A wide range of achievements was recorded both in terms of developing welfare facilities, and of implementing capacity building or service programmes. In terms of facilities, the deliverables included the building of two one-stop social service centres to provide office space for welfare organisations and small business enterprises, as well as facilities for workshops for the disabled. There was the construction of a child and family centre to provide services for abused children, including a temporary home for these children and the employment of fourteen social workers to provide crisis intervention, trauma and short-term counselling. In addition, there was the establishment of a home-based frail care programme for elderly people in need of services such as nutrition and basic health care. The programmes included also the

training of more than one hundred and twenty out-of-work, out-of-school youths from the former ANC-aligned SDUs and the IFP aligned SPUs. Funding and technical support were provided to eighty-one youth organisations; approximately five hundred community constables received life-skills training. Finally, a campaign was undertaken to combat violence against women.

Local level politics complicated the founding of welfare programmes. For example, in its planning and implementation, the Child and Family Care Centre was caught in severe community conflict. The 1999 evaluation of the KSiPP voiced scepticism as to the sustainability of services, given the management difficulties. The KSiPP put an operational budget aside for the Child and Family Care Centre and handed it over to an NGO, which failed to manage it effectively. Local level rivalries between community organisations, party political groupings and key individuals delayed implementation for several months. Currently the project is experiencing difficulty in maintaining part of the building and has approached the council for intervention. Yet, despite its obvious shortcomings, councillors and officials hail this project for its intense consultation process, involving community members, politicians and professionals.

What is more, the findings of post-facto evaluations of the projects have been largely positive. Social welfare facilities are still operational and are highly valued in the area. Moreover, the institutional building that was undertaken led to authorities working together on many projects. In 2003, local officials noted that social services projects were amongst the most durable precisely because management arrangements for the facilities were put in place early on (Interview: Boksburg housing official, 2003). Furthermore, home-based care services initiated in the KSiPP have been supplemented by new programmes directed at people living with HIV and AIDS. Thus, the frail care services for the elderly, bed-ridden and people living with AIDS – rendered by community-based organisations (CBOs) in collaboration with Natalspruit hospital – are being sustained through funding from the Gauteng departments of Health and Social Services.

Evaluations found, however, that the capacity-building projects were not sustainable, the reason being that they were not rooted effectively in the community. Councillors

report that “There is no relation between councillors and NGOs/CBOs – councillors’ lack knowledge of the existence of such organisations” (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003). Clearly there has been a failure to entrench a partnership approach in social service delivery. The NGO support programmes were conducted in isolation from other KSiPP interventions; thus the possibility of linking NGOs to these projects was not optimised. The mushrooming of NGOs after the KSiPP might indicate vibrancy in civil society, but NGOs and CBOs report that there are insufficient facilities to accommodate all these emerging non-governmental structures.

The evaluations also found that the youth who had lost critical schooling and had been left traumatised by the violence, were not assisted through trauma counselling or skills development. The long-term impact of the urban war on young people was painfully evident in focus groups conducted in 2003. Youth representatives talked of their low skill levels and unemployment, their frustrating search for activities to occupy themselves, and their memories of the war. It goes without saying that they were despondent about their future prospects.

Education

A culture of learning and teaching has seemingly been restored in the Kathorus area. Within the education sub-sector, many projects have been successfully concluded, including the upgrading of one hundred schools, the building of five new ones and the establishment of an early childhood development project. A schools’ partnership training programme built the capacity of stakeholder groups to participate in schools. In order to provide literacy and numeracy training to adults, eight fully equipped containers were purchased and several facilitators employed.

The upgrading and development of schools exceeded the initial budget, as with its success, it was allocated more funds (GPG, 1999a). Schools now have toilet facilities and additional classrooms that reduce over-crowding. A cursory view of the buildings indicates that school facilities are still in a good condition. However, key to their ongoing maintenance is effective monitoring and maintenance. Such a programme does not exist for the Gauteng province as a whole, and Gauteng Department of Education (GDE) officials were unable to confirm the details of maintenance programmes in Kathorus schools in February 2003. But the failure here is at a

provincial level, rather than specific to Kathorus (Zack *et al.*, 2003). The participatory processes put in place in this project were critical to the refurbishment programme's sustainability. Vandalism is an enormous problem in Kathorus schools, and even new infrastructure has been vandalised, especially in secondary schools. The School Development Forums, however, have allowed for a close monitoring, quick reporting and quick response to these problems. In one instance, ten computers were stolen from Nokulunga Primary School. The Local School Development Forum raised the theft as an issue, sparking discussions there and in the community around school ownership and responsibility. Shortly thereafter, the computers were returned to the school. In many instances, the same strategy was applied to deal with vandalism.

One of the singular successes of the project in early childhood development (ECD) was integration between different government departments. In line with the GDE ECD's vision of multi-services 'hubs' [or uMusa], a number of partnerships have evolved between ECD, Health and Welfare practitioners. In fact, the project also attempted to tap the skills of the business sector. Although this has not proved particularly successful so far, awareness has been created around ECD provision. In fact, almost all education projects have involved the active cooperation of non-governmental service providers.

In a short time-span, the Back to the Fast Track project, intended to help children return to school had a positive impact. With support from the project, the children and their families managed to overcome the barrier of poverty to confront the seemingly hostile world of schooling.

Sport, Recreation and Business Development

Sport and Recreation

Approximately fifty individual projects were undertaken in terms of providing sport, recreation and business development over the five-year implementation period.

To begin with, there were a number of key developments on the sporting front. Three sports stadiums were upgraded and repaired; a street sports centre was built in Katlehong and a mini-league programme was created. Approximately eighteen soccer fields were levelled and new goal posts were provided in Katlehong. An Olympic-size

pool was built in Vosloorus, as were sixteen multi-purpose courts throughout Kathorus, and an indoor sports complex in Thokoza. There was also the development of a range of activities – including youth camps and sporting clinics. The first cricket pitch was developed in the area in Huntersfield Stadium. There were also a number of developments regarding libraries and community halls. Two new libraries were built in Spruitview and Zonkizizwe; and three existing libraries were upgraded; six community halls were rehabilitated, and two new halls were developed. Moreover, four cemeteries in Kathorus were restored and upgraded and provided with fencing and landscaping, and twenty-six parks were upgraded and fitted with play equipment.

The sports and recreation initiatives have had a high impact on the lives of the youth, as the main users of the facilities. In focus groups residents spoke with pride of the high quality stadiums, which have given the youth new opportunities – several of whom now compete at both a national and international level. A good number of sports are accommodated in the facilities, which are accessible to users including people with disabilities. The excellent standard of these facilities is recognised at a regional level – to the extent that Vosloorus stadium hosted two national soccer games in 2002. Sports officials present at focus group meetings in 2003 said that the facilities had enabled people from different areas and of different political persuasions to come together in sharing rather than rivalry.

The establishment of the Phola Park Community Centre is a symbol of unity in an area once torn and divided. The area was formerly divided into ANC and IFP strongholds with no access for people whose allegiance was with the competing party. Now there is unhindered movement across the area, with all groups using the community centre. Indeed, they even use the centre together for civic events, and people freely sporting ANC and IFP t-shirts often attend ward meetings.

What is more, the working relationship between the sport and recreation officials in the three local councils was reported to have improved since the initiation of the KSiPP – which has necessitated cooperation on several projects (Zack *et al.*, 2003).

Business Development

An early evaluation of the Kathorus project gave it a rating of “0” for economic development and indicated that the lead project manager had suggested that economic development was not part of his mandate but that this had to be dealt with at other levels (Napier and Rust, 2002). The stated intention of the KSIPP was to develop a framework for “increased stability, restoration, upgrading, economic growth and development and thereby ensure that industry remains within the area” (KSPP, 1994a). It is hardly surprising, given that the aim was simply to retain existing industry, that economic or business development did not form a core component of the initial planning. In the early stages of the project no portfolio was dedicated to this cause; instead a focus on business evolved gradually over the life of the project. One of the key achievements of this portfolio were the staging of a Business’96 Conference, during which private sector organisations committed themselves to assisting in the development of business in Kathorus. Other crucial achievements were the establishment of the Kathorus Economic Development Initiative (KEDI), to expand economic opportunities for residents, and of the Kathorus Market Society to develop market sites and improve local trading conditions.

The most notable feature of the business development portfolio, as a KSPP project, is the extent to which it gleaned/accessed funding from other sources than the project. This remarkable achievement of added value to the KSPP is attributable to the energetic personalities of the coordinators of both the business development and the sports and recreation portfolios. However, in terms of attracting or retaining large business in the proximity of Kathorus, the KSIPP fared weakly, and the evaluations of both KEDI and the Market Society showed very poor results.

Communication

Nine communication projects were undertaken over the five-year implementation period. The key achievements included the establishment of an organisation to promote the economic development of women in Kathorus; the founding of a community-based newspaper, and the launching of the Kathorus Community Radio. In addition, there were ongoing public relations efforts during the project’s

implementation – involving press releases, articles in the print media, and the arranging of launches and project openings.

A key civic communication campaign, the Masakhane project, assisted local governments in encouraging residents to pay for local government services. Although increased levels of payment were ultimately achieved, these were not nearly as high as were hoped for. Payment levels did not rise beyond 35 per cent (GPG, 1999a).

A crucial consideration of the KSiPP was its visibility – a product of marketing and communication. In a sense the KSiPP can be deemed a failure in that many people did not even know about the project or its different components. Over time, the lack of real awareness of the project's workings has come to light. People participating in focus groups were often vague about project details. Given that several participants were drawn from ward committees, and hence were ex-action area committee members, one would suppose they would be knowledgeable about the KSiPP. Most tellingly, they could not name the project's major successes and often required prompting to recall the large range of project inputs in different functional areas. As a Kathorus councillor noted, "There was insufficient awareness of the Presidential Project. It needed a bigger communication campaign" (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003). The particular issues surrounding participation in the KSiPP are explored in the following chapter.

While not excessive in its self-promotion, the KSiPP did embark on a publicity campaign. There was the understanding that "unless the project itself actively generates good publicity, it will not occur. Instead, negative features of the project become highlighted" (KSPP, 1996).

Nonetheless, there were some durable successes within the communication portfolio. The Women's Development Fund was formed on the basis of findings that came out of a women's summit, so there was a spin-off beyond the direct publicity created by the summit. In addition, local government capacity was increased in training courses undertaken by local government officials.

Conclusion

This narrative has shown that the KSiPP achieved most of its objectives. It also created favourable conditions for continued improvement in the quality of life for the residents of Katlehong, Thokoza and Vosloorus. The tale of this achievement, on the one hand, tells of high levels of delivery within focused consultant-driven processes. On the other hand, the tale tells of institutional complexity, of multiple agendas, of particular personalities and of unfulfilled objectives. There is yet another layer underlying this complex tale: the power structures that influenced project execution, and the processes that involved and excluded stakeholders in decision-making. There were the choices made by project managers, and the rationales underlying these decisions. Moreover, there were the tensions between delivery and process, and the roles of particular individuals in the project. All these complicating factors are the subjects of a further analysis of the KSiPP. The previous chapter has sketched the context for this narrative, and this one has presented the project's process and outcomes. This focus is extended in the following chapter, in which the KSiPP will be examined through the lenses of critical pragmatism – from the perspective of context, outcomes, power, rationality and ethics.