

CHAPTER EIGHT

ANALYSIS OF THE KSiPP THROUGH THE LENSES OF CRITICAL PRAGMATISM

Introduction

The outcomes of the Kathorus Special Integrated Presidential Project (KSiPP) are undoubtedly linked to the articulation of goals that were then pursued in a concentrated way and were achieved in large measure over the five-year period. Yet, explaining the outcomes only in terms of such a rational methodology is, at the very least, limited. This explanation is a contextual one and does not account for the socio-historical realities of Kathorus or the unique timing of the KSiPP. In addition, it excludes the conscious engagement with institutional, political and neighbourhood politics and power structures. It also does not account for the exercise of power within the planning process or the intensely deliberative methodologies that buoyed the passage of the KSiPP. Furthermore, it denies the role of the rationality and rationalising of plans and choices made. Finally, the explanation of planning intention-leading outcomes, while powerful in the case of a project with such apparently high levels of success, does not ask the questions of how the goals were defined or what the measures of success are. It does not probe the pursuit or neglect of ethical and just choices or examine the values that underpinned the decision-making around the project.

This chapter analyses the outcomes of the KSiPP in terms of the lenses of critical pragmatism developed in Chapter Five. While the lenses are not discreet and each overlaps with the others, they are presented for the sake of analysis as separate themes. The linkages are drawn in the discussion within this structure. The chapter does not attempt to comprehensively analyse all aspects of the KSiPP against every lens. Rather, it demonstrates the application of the critical pragmatic framework by analysing a select number of pertinent factors through the five lenses.

The structure of the remainder of the chapter is as follows: The lenses of context and outcome, which are also the subject of the previous two chapters, are briefly dealt with in section two and three respectively. Section four analyses the dimension of

power in the planning process, incorporating the factors of institutional power, collaborative processes and the power of personalities. Section five focuses on the use and place of rationality in the KSiPP, particularly with regard to the overall planning strategy. Section six examines key choices made in the KSiPP that highlight questions of value judgments that impacted on outcome. Section seven is the conclusion.

Context: “The Process and Timing – That Time will never Come Again...”

A particularly valuable question for the analysis is whether lessons from this project can be drawn for other projects or whether the circumstances were so unique as to render the findings utterly peculiar. Chapter Six outlines the context to the KSiPP and the implications for a project of this nature. This section briefly adds to those findings extracted from interviews and project documentation that explain the impact of the unique timing of the project on the process and outcomes achieved. The particular insights relate to a buoyant national mood, the transition from a security focus to a developmental focus, the lack of policy frameworks, the lack of public sector capacity, and project implementation as an extension of national programmes.

The high profile afforded to the KSiPP as a ‘presidential lead project (ANC 1994, Annexure 1) with an attachment to then President Nelson Mandela seemed to imbue these projects with a special energy. There is repeated mention in interviews of consultants and officials being dedicated beyond the call of duty – working extended hours and setting aside other work to focus on the Kathorus Project. This may in part have been because this was a uniquely integrated project in that it attempted to address an area holistically while coordinating the work of various departments. The consequence of attempts at integration was that the project engaged many officials in the local authorities simultaneously. However, the project team leader (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002) noted that what influenced officials and consultants to commit so energetically was subtler. It was the project’s attachment to then President Nelson Mandela as well as to a sense of new possibilities that inspired the team:

South Africa had not fallen apart in the transition. We had a black president; there was a buoyant national mood. We had ‘Madiba Magic’ in Kathorus. It was a brave new world and we

were building a new South Africa. There was a sense of passion around the project.

This mood was linked to the high concern with maintaining stability. The context of violence overpowered all other contextual influences on the project strategy during the early days of the KSPP (KTG, 1994a). In fact, the project leader (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 1999) would say, "... the first priority was security. It was to HOLD the situation." This meant that terms such as 'emergency phase' were used to describe project selection and, in prioritising projects for this phase, decision-makers focused on those projects likely to impact positively on security (KSPP, 1994a). The concern was to deliver projects that would quickly show state commitment to delivery but, where possible, could detract attention from violence. This was, for example, the key motivation for levelling soccer fields in the emergency phase (Interview: KSiPP sport and recreation consultant, 1999). But it is a preoccupation that had to be consciously translated into the developmental focus that was deemed to be the key to consolidating peace efforts. Gastrow notes the perceived link between socio-economic upliftment and peace:

Socio-economic development within townships, driven both by the state and the private sector, is an important contributor to stability and the defusing of conflict. Businesses and industries which adjoin townships or which draw their labour from townships have a direct responsibility to become involved. (1996:6)

In describing the difficulties of translating national agendas and the concerns of the KTG into concrete projects, the project team leader noted,

At the outset there was a confused situation. The technicians [like (the project manager) and myself] came in at a later stage. The initial process was driven by security, political and national agendas. We came in later and had to make sense of the thinking of the politicians and the securocrats... (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 1999)

The key official charged with overseeing the SiPPs projects nationally, who quipped of the early days of the project, endorsed this, "at national level we knew nothing about implementation" (Interview: SiPPs manager, national Department of Housing, 1999).

At a broader level, the consultants and strategists of the KSiPP had to rely on their own knowledge and wit in forging frameworks. In this they were greatly assisted by the fact that the strategic consultant had been so close to the policy-making process at a national level through his chairmanship of the National Housing Forum (NHF) as discussed in Chapter Six. During an interview in 2002, the project team leader noted:

The RDP [Reconstruction and Development Programme] was not yet written when we started. A lot of stuff was forming in the background, but we had few fixes against which to set our sails. It was an uncertain world. It was good to have someone like (the strategic consultant) at that stage. He had been in the development business. He understood what the development challenges were. He had a good sense of where the policy issues would settle. (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2003)

This was however also a period of opportunity. The link between the state's transition and unclear policy and power opportunities are explored further in the later discussion of the relationship between power and rationality. The latitude that this flux afforded consultants is also explored below in the examination of collaborative and manipulative approaches employed by the project manager.

In implementation terms the KSiPP had to import national policy and in some cases piloted this policy. At localised levels the engineering functional area was, for example, forging its way in emerging policy around the employment of small contractors and so having to design appropriate tender documentation. In housing, the KSiPP delivered new units through the national subsidy framework. Here the project was not above the criticisms being levelled at housing projects throughout the country. Residents of the 12,500 new houses built in Kathorus expressed reservations about their housing. These projects were initiated in the early days of the new government's housing subsidy scheme. There were many criticisms of the state's housing scheme, especially around the issue of standards. Developers here, as elsewhere, faced confusion and raised expectations. As one councillor noted,

People wanted housing. The RDP was famous amongst poor people who saw it as 'free houses'. But the policies were not clear. Houses were smaller than people expected and there was a negative response... (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003)

Notwithstanding resident dissatisfaction, however, officials note that home ownership has had a significant impact on community building in Kathorus:

People have started to care for their areas; areas were redlined that are now being upgraded. Squatter areas in some of these places have been cleared and there is investment. (Interview: Alberton RDP manager, 2003)

There are differing perspectives on the value of private or public sector management for projects of this nature (Napier and Rust, 2002). Given the timing of the SiPPs the options available for management were context-specific as local government was almost universally lacking in legitimacy, and uneven in terms of its capacity to deliver. In Kathorus the project came under criticism for its heavy use of consultants. It was, however, unapologetic about this, emphasising the focus on fast track delivery, which it indeed achieved. The consultant-driven approach introduced a year into the project, when it became clear that existing public systems and capacity were inadequate, delivery had not begun, and the project was in serious danger of failing.

There are several examples of the KSiPP focusing on parochial issues rather than long term, strategic or regional concerns. It is significant that the project was not intended to provide regional direction or solution. In fact, the KSiPP was in large measure a spatially isolated intervention. The strategic consultant to the project termed it ‘expedient’ and was unapologetic about this. The crisis in the area was so large; its own problems so great, that an outward focus would have been a distraction. This possibly accounts for the fact that the spatial plan for the area was only developed within one of the housing projects and fairly late in the programme. It did not particularly guide development within the KSiPP... (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999)

Outcomes: “We Were Results Oriented”

The previous chapter sketches the process and outcomes of the KSiPP. This section briefly focuses on the implications of the consciously results-oriented approach that was employed in the project. This general approach expressed itself in a focus on visible projects, on speed of delivery and on a sustained momentum of delivery.

In accounting for the success of the KSiPP, the strategic consultant focused on the ‘pragmatic’ attitude to development. He attributed the success to a range of factors including the streamlining of decision-making structures and the appointment of the

politically astute project manager. Above all, though, he notes pragmatism. This tone was set by the steering committee of whom the strategic consultant noted:

The political players at all levels within the steering committee were pragmatic. If they hadn't been (and they could easily not have been; they could have put their own egos first), there would be no project... (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999)

The strategic consultant further linked this pragmatic approach to an opportunistic attitude, another key success factor in his mind. He noted that if the project had hooked into planning ethics such as equity and participatory issues it would have become too complex. For the strategic consultant (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999) this did not mean that it did not operate from a set of values, but it was based on maximising a competitive advantage to gain access to funding.

In interviews, the project leader invariably framed his discussion and interpretations of the Kathorus Project in terms of its goal-orientedness and its outcomes. He said of the project consulting team, "... we were results-oriented..." and of the definition of needs and project goals,

The physical plan could not be developed at an early stage because local authorities were too fluid. We could not have pulled together the parties that were essential for an overall plan at the start. It was better to proceed on the basis that we did. We knew what the major problems were and we tackled those." (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 1999, 2002)

The project team leader maintained that the need for delivery was so powerful that it overrode any need for lengthy planning or for participation:

In a context of a community that had gone through hell for a number of years, in a sense people were prepared to hold back on the need for planning involvement and participation. It was more important that their communities were rebuilt around them... (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002)

At the same time, the new state had to show delivery as it attempted to consolidate its legitimacy. The implementation of the RDP vision was the key focus in this drive. Politicians in Kathorus who were at the forefront of development initiatives were eager to see results. The strategic consultant acknowledged the importance of creating visible projects for this reason:

We knew that the operating environment for projects was difficult, but we had to show the funders, the politicians and the community that you can negotiate development in difficult circumstances. Nothing had happened there for so long. We just had to show that life could get better. The short-term projects were things to deliver just to do something. It was to show that something was possible in this environment. (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999)

Indeed, showing government that delivery was being achieved was a critical success factor. In a strategic memo on Special Presidential Projects, it is noted that urban renewal projects may only receive a “Presidential P” if they are

demonstration projects with national impact and relevance, are highly visible, and have the organisational capacity and long-term vision to yield short-term progress that will contribute to the longer term establishment of viable, dynamic urban metropolis (sic).

The document continues, “The extent to which they reverse the effects of apartheid planning in the process of post-apartheid delivery, will also be taken into account” (SPP, 1995). In order of priority, impact and high visibility of projects was paramount. Bond bemoans the fact that the concerns to reverse the effects of apartheid – concerns that were well articulated in the RDP – was secondary to delivery in these projects:

To be sure the RDP has various flaws... but the micro prescriptions for urban policy would have made an enormous difference to the form and content of cities, had they been adopted and not ignored. (Bond, 2003:53)

The results-orientedness of the KSiPP extended beyond the notion of immediate delivery. It embraced a sustained pace of visible development. The initial focus on emergency services was closely followed by rehabilitation and repair and then new development. Building and upgrading of the area was a constant focus over the five-year period with a continual rollout of new projects. The project team leader believed that this pace was critical to maintaining the legitimacy of the KSiPP and he would note that he constantly sought enough of a mandate to continue with implementation: “We had to have sufficient momentum. If we were slow we would have become bogged down. Accusations fester when you have no action...” (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002).

An interplay between the need for delivery at a national level, the pressures at local level and the hopes for a longer-term, strategic focus were brought to bear in the housing portfolio where delivery won out. Although several housing programmes ‘failed’, none of these halted delivery of the overall KSiPP. Programmes that failed, were generally those which focused on policy and strategy, and may have been ‘ahead of their time’. This was because housing delivery in the first few years after South Africa’s transition to democracy focused on the quick delivery of individual projects, rather than taking the longer view of integrated development. The highly localised, internally directed focus of the KSiPP emphasised urgent delivery needs, which were delivered in situ and arguably served to reinforce existing structures and spatial patterns. There is little evidence of efforts made in the development of new housing, for example for strategic land use planning that might have challenged the apartheid city form of these areas to be undertaken. Rather, the subsidised low-income housing projects undertaken were located within the existing townships and on their peripheries, where, like similar projects across the country, they reinforced the disadvantages of the apartheid city with poor access to social services and employment opportunities (Pillay *et al.*, 2006). This was so in spite of the attempts by consultants to develop an overall housing policy for the area (GPG, 1999a). The project team’s housing expertise is interesting in this regard. Three of the key KSiPP consultants had historically worked at the Urban Foundation, a key centre of housing policy development from the mid-1970s to mid-1990s. Their influence in attempting to create a strategic housing focus and to strengthen housing institutions is not surprising. However, the more strategic approach was not compatible with the high-speed delivery focus of the day. An ex-Germiston housing official notes that,

The KSiPP was just trying to sort out accommodation in particular parts of Kathorus. Long term it was left for local authorities to sort out. There was no holistic plan. The overall housing shortage was not part of the plan. (Interview: Germiston housing official, 2003)

Housing officials report that they had little influence over the nature, location, type and size of projects to be delivered. Rather, they were provided with stringent guidelines and limitation and had to fit projects into these – “I don’t know where the criteria came from for deciding on projects...”

This echoes Pieterse's concern that post-apartheid planning has not been transformative; it has not challenged the fundamental inequalities of society. Pieterse suggests that this absence of challenge relates to the consensual politics in which such planning has been contextualised (Pieterse, 2004a).

The geographical context of the KSiPP – on three African townships – limited the possibility of addressing spatial inequities across the wider urban context. The project effectively operated within apartheid spatial confines. (Urban renewal projects largely continue to deal with 'townships' as isolated entities.) This geographic limitation is most problematic for those services or functions that obviously do not respect geographic boundaries. These include functions such as economic development, which have extremely limited scope unless they cross-geographic boundaries.

At the policy level, an outcomes-focused approach contextualised the project, and was aided by an area-based approach. The national SiPPs approach had been designed with such a focus in mind and was in turn aligned with an international discourse that advocated area based planning. At the level of Kathorus it drove the single-minded focus on the local area only, as discussed in the context section, above.

There was a high cost for the results-orientedness and focus on speed, as noted in evaluations. The KSiPP was termed a "shock treatment" (Interview: Ekurhuleni mayor (current), 2003). However, a slower implementation programme may have had more advantages in the longer term. It may have allowed more time for the training of the unemployed and of emerging contractors and by extension for the creation of more sustainable jobs. The upgrading work may have been more carefully synchronised to the ability of residents to afford the new services. More in-depth community involvement in and understanding of the projects would have been possible. Finally, the programme would have been able to set up and monitor longer-term maintenance procedures (GPG, 1999a).

The latter point became a particular concern after the KSiPP. The resources provided by KSiPP to upgrade the infrastructure undoubtedly helped stabilise the area and kick-start development. The basic amenities for everyday life were in place by the end of the project (1999) – an achievement that would have seemed impossible during the

1990s, given the budget constraints on local authorities. But every intervention would require money for operation and maintenance, in order to sustain these inputs. This load inevitably fell to local authorities. The ex-RDP officer of Alberton (Interview: Alberton RDP manager, 1999) says that the local authorities raised this issue with provincial government, but that it has not been addressed. It was lamented, “We developed nice projects, but did not set aside programmes to sustain the projects. We didn’t think beyond the Presidential Project...” (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003).

South African development practice in the early 1990s was the product of adopted and adapted international planning and development discourse, of nationally negotiated consensual positions and of a mix of old and emerging institutional approaches and capacities to deal with development demands. A tall and often opaque order faced the implementers. On the subject of implementation [in this case in the field of education] Simkins (in de Villiers, 1994) notes that a lack of detailed policy guidelines impedes any serious consideration of implementation: “You find yourself in a position of having to smuggle in assumed policy positions.” Pieterse (2003:133) examines the disparity between policy and implementation with regard to integration. His analysis shows a gap between the discourse of intention to reverse apartheid-style segregation and the reality. He places the blame for this in part on a “politically correct rhetoric” of integration that insists on focusing on spatial solutions in an assumed consensual framework of “partnership” and “voluntarism”. Further, he notes that spatial planning is emphasised as the tools for fostering urban integration, but that this approach ignores the need for the state to intervene in urban land markets and for approaches to localised integration to be “socially situated” and negotiated (and renegotiated) (Pieterse, 2003).

Power: Taking liberties in times of crisis

The early Kathorus SIPP documentation of project intentions, timed as it was, forged a close fit with the policy rhetoric within the frameworks discussed in Chapter Six. At the same time the project was deeply influenced by the ‘forces from below’. These were the socio-political difficulties and tensions on the ground as well as the institutional dynamics of the local level state.

A critical approach to analysis requires an unpacking of the issues surrounding structures of domination and power dynamics within the project. In the KSiPP these are demonstrated through the collaborative nature of the planning approach employed as well as through institutional dynamics and the intended and actual community involvement in the project. This section shows the power wielded through the exercise of planning to have been highly deliberative. After an analysis of this approach, the institutional power dynamics surrounding the KSiPP are analysed. Finally the engagement of the project with its constituency, through participation is examined.

“We Talked Ourselves to Pieces”: The Role of Collaborative, Deliberative Power

In the more traditional exercise of planning in terms of the setting of priorities and guiding implementation, as well as in ongoing engagement with a politically charged environment at neighbourhood and institutional level, the planning process in the KSiPP involved intense and ongoing deliberation. The extent to which such deliberation pursued consensus was uneven.

Deliberation in Setting the Preconditions for the KSiPP

As a direct follow-up to the intense negotiations of the peace processes mentioned in Chapter Six, the KTG was also a seat of deliberation. There was a sense in the early days of project conceptualisation that getting things moving quickly required a lot of talking and negotiating. This had to happen from outside of the state to keep coordination going. It was this that led the KTG chairperson (Interview, 1999) to quip, “... we talked ourselves to pieces”. The urgency was context-bound. Not only was the brokering of peace critical given high levels of violence, but also the need for development agreement was being driven by the new state’s pressure for quick delivery and Kathorus was consciously a flagship in that drive. The possible disillusionment of the poor in a lack of delivery was understood to be one of the greatest threats to legitimacy for the new, democratic government. Allied to the state’s need to show delivery was the time pressure for achieving a plan that could be presented for funding release. The competition with other areas of need was high in the period of application for Presidential Lead funding. In spite of infighting that would almost bring the project to a standstill in 1995, these pressures motivated an overall commitment to consensus. So much so that evaluations would conclude that the high profile figures of the KTG represented a range of constituencies, yet in their

comments on the peace process they continually surprised in their approach and responses, which did not obviously fit the profile of their organisations (GPG, 1999a). The trust and common ground that built up over these deliberations contributed to the willingness of the various groupings to endorse the strategic plan for Kathorus that was presented in 1994.

Deliberation in Multidimensional Professional Team

Within the professional consultant team a high level of consensus was sought through deliberation. This engagement was intense and regular. There was a powerful commitment on the part of the project leader to pursue common ground. It would have been naive to expect that common ground could be achieved through agreement on all aspects of strategy in each functional area. In fact the various consultants [and in particular the security and social services portfolio] reported that they were often in highly antagonistic disagreement with one another over spending priorities. The lead consultant actively drove consensus through the pragmatic preoccupation with delivery. He constantly focused on what level of agreement was required and what action was needed to achieve delivery out of the deliberations. In commenting on this approach, several of the consultants (Interviews: KSiPP social services, security and engineering coordinators, 1999) said that the project team leader's role was to "keep his eye on the ball..." In his own words the team leader describes this commitment to action:

I periodically had to put the team together, I asked people about their problems, We looked at the lessons to be learnt...It was a team effort, we were constantly on the phone, we worked together all the time. It helped that we had frequent meetings. We met once a week to co-ordinate things. We all had value systems in our head but a common value system emerged – we had to deliver to the people of Kathorus. We grew to trust each others' judgement. We spoke about the problems so often. This was important. It pulled us together... (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 1999)

The collaborative effort continued throughout the project. However, the need for overt consensus was not uniform and it was reported to have waned as the years of the project progressed. The social services portfolio, for instance, bemoaned decisions to increase expenditure on housing or engineering services without adequate discussion (Interview: KSiPP social services coordinator, 1999). The power of the technician

rationality of the ‘hard services’ in this regard is discussed later in this chapter. This lowered vigilance around consensus was related to a project management confidence that grew with the visible achievements of the project; the improvements in relations on the ground [in terms of increased levels of peace at community level]; and the improved institutional capacity at local government level that evolved through the life of the project.

Within the lens of power, deliberation is closely allied to integrated delivery where this concept concerns the coordination of the functions and activities of different actors. There was a concern to give effect to the prevailing development approach of integrated governance through these demonstration presidential projects (Coombs and Leamy, 2004). This was implemented through each level of project design and execution. The KSiPP had to secure commitments from various departments in local, provincial and national government, in order to implement its business plans. For example, it required commitments in terms of the long-term operation and maintenance of facilities that were being implemented. At least in part, the KSiPP and other presidential projects (see McCarthy, Forster, Mchunu and Smit, 2004) were successful in achieving integrated service delivery. McCarthy *et al.* (2004) suggest that this success in the presidential projects helped to reinforce the national preoccupation with integrated development planning as a tool of developmental local governance.

Collaboration and Manipulation: "There were Liberties we could Take in the Heat of the Battle"

The conscious and aggressive channelling of the KSiPP through political and institutional hurdles was led by the project manager in an interactive and strategic way that bordered on intrigue and conspiracy. All the consultants worked in highly interactive and deliberative ways. In terms of an overt employment of collaborative approach as a tool in engagement with power, the project manager’s stories are noteworthy. His interactive style and focus on talking, strategising and ‘politicking’ was almost cavalier. Evaluations found that this approach was so interactive, and free of procedural rules, that he has left a paucity of documentation on the political lessons and anecdotes that were experienced in the project. This made it difficult fully to capture and pass on his experience, successes and failures (GPG, 1999a). His

consciously manipulative approach is captured in his own reading of his responsibilities. The roles he saw for himself were overtly political and collaborative and best demonstrate the power-infused deliberative approach within the KSiPP. They included manipulating institutional opportunities in favour of the KSiPP's ability to deliver, manipulating and diffusing political powers through project interventions, maintaining local government cooperation, and mediating between consultants and the state. These are discussed below.

1) Optimising institutional opportunity

The space that was created for such latitude was contextual. The timing of the KSiPP during the period of transition meant that local government was in flux. Local government legitimacy was tenuous. There were few systems in place for planning or managing a project of this nature at a regional scale. On the one hand, this hampered decision-making processes at a local level and much deliberative energy was wasted trying to get commitments out of councils. On the other hand, it meant that there was relatively little political interference in the project. New councillors were not yet in place and local government was finding its feet. The KSiPP was therefore able to direct the development focus of local government and to give concrete meaning to this new drive (GPG, 1999a). A particular methodology employed by the project manager for driving this meaning was in the conscious planting of staff in local government structures. The era was immediately post-elections, and local governments were shifting to address new areas of jurisdiction and to take on revised functions. There was considerable deployment and employment of new staff. The project manager read this as an opportunity to establish influence and buy in from within. Using his political contacts as well as his relationships with key officials and his strong influence at provincial government level, he paved the way for several KTG members and Wits/Vaal Peace Secretariat staff to be employed in local government. The KTG chairperson (Interview, 1999) recalls, "(The project manager) looked after the KTG people. He got them 'planted' in local government, to help the process... It was a skilful management stroke – it raised the suspicion of existing officials who felt that the RDP was building an empire," but over time the presence of some of these personalities would smooth engagements with officials in local government.

2) Manipulating and diffusing political power through project interventions

For the project manager the alignment of popular perceptions with the KSiPP and vice-versa involved many mass meetings, individual meetings with stakeholder groups and face-to-face meetings with influential community leaders. He felt the pressure of co-opting all sides of the varied conflicts on to the KSiPP bandwagon. In this, the project manager reported that his African National Congress (ANC) background was a complicating factor: it proved difficult to co-opt the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999). His value judgments in this are clear, as his approach to the challenge was to style his communication and his strategy to fit the mould of the grouping he worked with. Crudely, in terms of ANC aligned groupings the project manager relied on the democratic style of falling in with the mass will. He indicated that he would appeal to the broad support of mass meetings, and the support of higher ranks within the ANC and use his own profile in the party to ‘pull rank’ with these stakeholder groups. The project manager determined that winning the support of IFP groupings at grassroots level required winning the support of leadership. His understanding of the more traditional structures of the IFP, which operated according to traditional hierarchies, meant that once he could get the support of the leadership, the support of others would follow.

Juggling benefits between the two factions was also important. The project manager recognised that whatever was done for one party’s constituency impacted upon the sensitivity of the other party. Given their physical location within the body of the township as opposed to the hotels, meant that the ANC constituency benefited more from the direct benefits of the project. The project manager felt the need to balance this with benefits to IFP supporters in some way. He introduced measures to ensure that the IFP was favoured in several contracts. He arranged for IFP/hostel contractors to work in ‘deep ANC’ areas. Here the project manager would organise the youth to ensure the safety of contractors. He also ensured that IFP contractors got a substantial share of work, and even preferential status in tenders. ANC supporters accused him of favouring the IFP, but “I could handle confrontations with the ANC”. The project manager acknowledged that the effect of giving jobs to the IFP/traditional indunas¹ was to ‘divide and rule’ by co-opting this grouping whose followers lived in hostels

¹ An induna is a councillor or headman in traditional Nguni society. These leadership structures were often also present in urban hostels where Zulu speakers resided collectively.

and might have reservations about the project (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999). At key junctures the project manager forced the IFP leadership to take a political stand, as in the case of illegal occupancy of violence-damaged housing by IFP supporters. The IFP leadership could not publicly condone the occupation of houses and had to support the eviction. It took about six months to get the process worked out, but “this had to be ‘a politically inspired eviction’” (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999). Again the project manager ensured that indunas were used as contractors in this area and also undertook to relocate any genuine displacees.

3) Maintaining local government cooperation

The need to maintain good working relations with local government was critical. The project had to rely on these organs of state as implementing agents. Operationally this meant relying on the cooperation of officials and of politicians. If at any point the project antagonised any of the groups, they became reluctant to assist. In this respect the project manager’s assessment was that winning over the ‘older’ Afrikaner officials relied on understanding that their future was uncertain, that they were traditionalists confronted with new ideas and that they had been marginalised as Afrikaners. It was important to deal with them with the necessary respect that these factors demanded. The project manager always spoke in Afrikaans to these officials. Again, following the ethic of traditionalism, he sought out the powerful players in the local authorities and worked closely with them, even while he had constant interactions with the hierarchical heads, the chief executive officers of Germiston, Alberton and Boksburg. So the project manager (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999) noted, “In Germiston the chair of executive committee is very powerful, in Alberton (the RDP coordinator) is very powerful, and in Boksburg it is the mayor who ‘runs’ the council.”

New councillors were often in uncertain ground in the technical interventions of the KSiPP and here too the project manager used collaborative skill to win support. Many councillors had low levels of literacy and were frustrated by their dependence on officials who used ‘old methods’ of informing them, i.e. technical reports. This led to awkwardness and the project manager was sensitive to this. In one incident he was called into a council meeting to account for a hostel project that councillors said they

knew nothing about. He produced the written council approval for the project and then helped to ‘save’ the situation to avoid councillors losing face. He suggested the council revisit the item.

4) Mediating between consultants and local government

One of the major challenges the KSiPP project manager faced was to smooth the relationship between the project management team and community stakeholders. He found that the consultants often did not have the skills to deal with politicians. They found the politicians arrogant or unreasonable. On the other hand there was considerable mistrust of the project management team in the beginning: they were not from the community, and they were predominantly white (GPG, 1999a). Antagonism towards this consultant-driven process was recorded in a councillor focus group held in 2003: “We need to have hands-on coordinators, not consultants who sit in offices”. Some officials from local government echoed these sentiments:

We did not need consultants. The local authorities could have been trusted with the task. We used to do all the work. They consolidated it and put the business plans together. We could have saved costs and added value... (Interview: Germiston housing official, 2003)

The project manager would intervene, meeting with politicians on behalf of the consultants and vice versa. He would actively mediate and interpret the intentions and actions of each group for the other. This would sometimes be interpreted as the project manager dealing with the politics to free the consultants up to deal with technical issues, and is further explored within the section on the interplay between political and technical issues, later in this section. Of this mediating role, the team leader noted,

There was a lot of background noise. We had to make sense of the background noise. (The project manager) doesn’t truck fools. He would interpret the noise for us. He knows the politics and the language. He read the situations well and knew what was important and what wasn’t... (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002)

Impact of Institutional Power

1) Rivalries and tensions in state institutions

The complex institutional web that established management structures for the KSiPP [as outlined in the Chapter Six] represents a bureaucratic response to what was to be

the largest area based upgrading initiative ever undertaken in the country. It also reflects the adoption within the new state of the new public management (NPM) agenda for joined up governance. However, the appropriate institutional arrangement for this project was less than obvious and the route to altering these arrangements was fraught.

Once we had the funding we had our first institutional battle: between the steering committee, the provincial RDP office and line departments. The way it played out was that the steering committee ceased to exist, and a battle occurred at the political and administrative level. At the political level the provincial politicians couldn't bear local politicians to mobilise this scale of resources. At the administrative level line departments fought for control of the management of the programme. (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999)

By mid-1995 the project had become so entangled in bureaucratic battles that it was virtually at a standstill and the *Sunday Times* (29 July 1995 in GPG, 1999a:28) reported, "Central, provincial and local government have all insisted on approving every step while politicians and officials have bickered over control of expenditure".

Once these had been resolved and a provincial department had ultimate accountability and authority for the project, implementation proceeded. When interviewed in 2003, the Gauteng housing chief director ascribed the success of the project to the leadership role played by the province: "A provincial department must take overall responsibility for the urban renewal initiative from day one – and it must cut across all line functions. Otherwise there can't be integration of programmes" (Interview in Zack *et al.*, 2003).

He added that the other value of using provincial government is that it is more easily able to influence national departments such as safety and security [that do not have local level equivalents]. However, this view is contrasted by that of a municipal housing official (*ibid.*), who said that, "... if a similar initiative happened now, Ekurhuleni would not allow itself to be steamrolled by provincial government." The Gauteng housing chief director admitted that it was a tense relationship. Provincial government had no authority over local authority personnel, yet was releasing the money: this became awkward and required tight coordination between provincial and local level. The chief director (*ibid.*) believes that the role of the consultants in

managing that coordination and providing both a buffer and facilitator in mediating the tension was critical.

At local authority level new political parties had come on board in the transitional period and were introducing legitimacy to these bodies, even while they were still restructuring. These politicians/activists wanted immediate delivery. The provincial government, not similarly legitimate as yet [it was still the Transvaal Provincial Authority (TPA)], had to follow these demands. This created tension. The TPA tended to be bureaucratic, and was in charge of the money.

For officials at local level the KSiPP implied additional work. The social services coordinator emphasised that it is important not to under-estimate the extra burden that programmes such as the KSP put on local officials: each activity for the project was undertaken over and beyond day-to-day activities. The RDP budget was minuscule compared to the councils' budget or contributions to many projects. Yet officials were required to report on each RDP project with different sets of criteria and the like – without extra remuneration (Interview: KSiPP social services coordinator, 1999).

The power of institutional rivalry to interfere with the passage of planning should not be underestimated. In the KSiPP spatial planning and consequent allocation of resources and placing of facilities were not planned at a regional scale, but were handled parochially and separately within each municipality. Each project that dealt with cross-boundary planning became bogged down in disagreements between municipalities. The consequences were at times an inefficient allocation of resources and even duplication, as in the case of health centres discussed in Chapter Seven. The ironic outcome of this rivalrous history is almost comical, for, more recently, the nine separate municipalities on the East Rand have been absorbed into the metropolitan structure of Ekurhuleni, which gives statutory effect to the kind of regional planning pioneered in the KSiPP. Several officials of the newly formed metropolitan structure of Ekurhuleni note that the most important factor in the close cooperation of local authorities that now form southern Ekurhuleni [i.e. the Kathorus area] is their shared KSiPP history.

2) Role of civic structures

The issue of the bias towards the repair of violence-damaged housing carries a strong institutional-political component. A leading figure in the Displacees' Committee explained the political pressure for attention to this project. He recounted that the leadership of the Displacees' Committee came from the ANC. He said that in the transition, some local ANC leaders were absorbed into the bureaucracy or parliamentary structures. Disillusioned members took up struggles that the ANC did not take up, including the issue of displacees. As a powerful opposition to the leadership within government, this structure wields sway in the townships as a new social movement. It has taken on significance beyond housing by mobilising around other issues in the township including Khumalo Street; no-go areas, schools. In Thokoza the Displacees' Committee is the second most powerful voice to the ANC (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003). In this the committee has carved for itself an identity from a space vacated by other civic structures that were effectively immobilised in the post-apartheid struggle for a role and identity of popular movements (Marais, 1998).

Power and Participation

Chipkin (2002a) examines a distinction made between 'service delivery' and 'development' in the allocation of functions in the Cape Metropolitan Authority in 1996 as this authority and other local governments across the country were undergoing transformation in line with the provisions of the Local Government Transition Act of 1993. What is pertinent for the KSiPP is Chipkin's finding that what informed the distinction between community development and municipal services, was "the idea that the provision of health, housing and community services, on the one hand, required high levels of resident participation, whereas that of roads, water, electricity and so (sic), on the other hand did not" (Chipkin, 2002a:17). The latter services were considered to be of a technical and administrative nature, and decisions around their design and implementation believed to be best left to engineers and technical experts. The former services were considered to require participation and in Cape Town their implementation was tied to a process of delivery through participation. In the KSiPP this logic also prevailed as evidenced by the varying degrees of participation where the housing and social services portfolios engaged in more intense participation than other portfolios. Chipkin questions the base

assumption that these so-called community development services are the means by which sustainable livelihoods are achieved. The participation focus in Kathorus is relevant in terms of community level participation in the project, the tensions that the choices between delivery and empowerment set up, the relationship between empowerment and dependency, the ownership and sharing of information, and inclusion and exclusion in the project. These are examined below.

1) Community level engagement

Spatially Kathorus was divided into twenty-eight action areas as bases for community engagement. The business plan explains this division:

The purpose of dividing the larger area into smaller defined action areas is to ensure that the needs and problems within each action area can be addressed in a manner whereby the individuals and communities within that area are actively engaged... (KSPP, 1994a:11)

The purpose is further explained in an allusion both to the violence and to the crisis of legitimacy of local government that plagued the area at the time:

Furthermore that every investment within the action area is selected and implemented in a manner that strengthens the positive relationships within the community residing in the area and between the community and the local administration for the area. (KSPP, 1994a)

The action areas were defined along several lines including scale, municipal boundaries and service levels. But they were also manipulated such that interaction, cooperation and integration of people who had been in opposing ranks through violence and hostility were encouraged. So some areas were enveloped within one action area even though they fell under the jurisdiction of different local authorities, in order that hostel residents and surrounding residents would be encouraged to cooperate in terms of management structures. However, their purpose was soon limited to that of a sounding board. The team leader noted that:

The action areas in Kathorus were not about precinct planning. They were essentially a communication device. They were means by which we could keep people informed and allowing local communities to let off steam. If we had operated the planning within the twenty-eight action areas, we would have had problems. They could have become fiefdoms. It was important to work out planning decisions at a higher level. (Interview: KSIPP consultant team leader, 2002)

The creation of structures for participation did not automatically translate into effective communication between the project and residents. There is evidence that the

action area committees operated effectively in the early days of the KSiPP. However, some former action area committee members have subsequently commented that they went to meetings but often did not understand the details being presented and could not effectively communicate to their neighbours. A resident (Interview: Focus group (b), 2003) commented, "... Even though we appreciate what government has done, we need government to be transparent about giving us more information."

The effectiveness of these committees often depended on the personalities of those involved. In a few cases, the committees blocked progress on projects. A case was cited in which gravel roads were budgeted for an area, but the action area committee blocked the proposal because they wanted tarred roads. The project could not proceed (Interview: KSiPP communications coordinator, 1999).

Later, in the course of the project, participation via the action area committees was diluted when ward committees were established in line with the new democratic arrangements in local government. Links between the project and residents through councillors or ward committees weakened as time passed. The communications coordinator has suggested that action area committees were valuable early on when there were no democratically elected structures. The role for ongoing participation in a planning exercise once democratic processes were in place was assumed to be reduced. This seemed to be in line with the increasingly 'pragmatic' attitude of achieving sufficient consensus and mandate for action that is discussed under 'Outcomes', above.

At the level of broad community engagement, no particular portfolio was dedicated to participation in a holistic way. Such an approach would have removed participation from portfolios, which would have been undesirable, but a comprehensive view of participation may have been useful to the project. No one took express responsibility for getting community input other than the project manager and then his role was that of trouble-shooter and manager tasked with ensuring the success of the project. At a global level, an ongoing relationship with community structures was not maintained. Most of the project management team and indeed officials talked to were uncertain of 'what had happened' to the action area committees originally designed as the vehicles for participation. While the dissolution or marginalising of these committees appears

to have resulted from the political realities of the post-election availability of elected representatives and ward structures, a continued relationship with ward level structures or with councillors is not apparent. Rather participatory relationships were forged strategically and in a directed manner.

Individual functional areas achieved grassroots community participation in different ways. The safety and security projects involved the community in numerous ways, from participation in community policing forums which assisted in such exercises as the placing of SOS pillars and of satellite stations and contact points; through to employment as security staff in protecting developers and contractors or as wardens protecting SOS pillars. Most of the housing programmes involved extensive public participation and consultation through formal structures such as councils [and councillors] and less formal, representative community structures such as Action Area and Displacees' Committees and Hostel Residents Associations. However, the effectiveness of some of these channels is not always of the first order and many complaints were heard of councillors not reporting to their constituencies, or hostel residents' associations not becoming actively involved in forums that directly affect their members, for example.

The participatory approach used in the project was intended to engage only those residents directly involved in a particular project. This did not mean a reduced number of interactions, but rather a series of focused interactions. This proved to be an efficient means of interacting with a community on a wide range of development areas. The KSiPP avoided adopting an idealistic view of involving as many residents as possible in each project. It responded, rather, to the notion that participation is most relevant and effective when participants are directly affected by the subject matter of the consultations. This more focused approach was refined during the course of the project. Within each functional sector, committees consisting of relevant officials and representatives from community organisations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) were formed into task teams. These teams were the key bodies for consultation between the project and the community. This represented less participation than during the action area days.

The functional coordinators, interviewed in 1999, highlighted the difficulties of community participation, as well as their learning curve throughout the project's life span. Several of them emphasised the need to coach a community in the basics of effective participation – which must include some lessons on the workings and limits of government.

Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell (2002:200) identify impediments to participation, including a degree of cynicism amongst some officials and “participation fatigue” amongst some local residents, especially in low-income communities with a long anti-apartheid struggle history. This profile fits the Kathorus case. There is little evidence in the participatory process of active training of community agents or of empowering these agents in decision-making. This resulted in a situation where the members of action area committees legitimately claimed not to have been fully informed of the process, even though they were directly involved in participatory structures. For some residents this form of participation was not enough.

An interesting dialogue was recorded in a focus group between an action area committee member and another resident who remarked, “The action area committees didn't do their work properly. They didn't call enough meetings” (Interview: Focus group (b), 2003) to which the action area committee member responded, “People also got tired of mass meetings as the project went on.”

2) Tension between participation and delivery

It is difficult to measure the link between service delivery and integrative governance, including participation, and Harrison (Forthcoming) notes that the closest measure is the increased focus of expenditure towards areas of need. While he finds a need for greater participation and improved democratic processes to be incorporated in the IDP processes, he also finds it equally important for government to have effective systems for delivering services to its citizens. He does not favour a choice between greater mobilisation and greater efficiency of delivery. There is evidence that the conflict between rapid delivery and adequate participation was not always managed successfully in the Kathorus Project. When particular projects were being fast-tracked, the project management team only sought the support of those who were

most readily accessible, thereby not necessary exploring the full range of views in Kathorus.

Even at the level of representative participation, the delivery-led focus created stress.

A councillor described the sense of urgency imposed on decision-makers:

Officials would delay the process until the end of the financial year and then suddenly bring lots of items for councillors to approve. You found councillors could not give the items deep thought. There was money and we knew we would lose it if we didn't take it... (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003)

3) Empowerment and dependency

The issue of job creation in a project, while an apparently technical and benign exercise, turned out to be highly charged in the KSiPP. While impressive statistics in terms of person days of employment were recorded for the KSiPP, evaluations noted that employing local building contractors does not guarantee a significant impact on local job creation, because it depends on who they employ, in turn, to do the work. Most of the building contractors interviewed claimed to employ local unskilled labour on a temporary basis, but preferred to retain skilled staff on a permanent basis. Building contractors were also concerned that once the repairs were completed they would have no more work. A few felt confident enough to tender for work elsewhere, but most complained of a lack of working capital; their inability to provide sureties; discrimination against them by large, white companies who will not provide them with contracts; and an inability to compete with big firms. Most of the contractors interviewed seemed to have become dependent on the project for their livelihood. Several indicated that they would move out of the industry when the project finished to take up their old jobs (GPG, 1999a). This would imply that much of the capacity built up by the project would in fact dissipate after completion.

One of the more serious negative consequences of the repairs programme is that it created a whole culture of dependency on government funding. The local contractors, building inspectors and security guards employed by the programme now face the prospect of becoming unemployed as the programme winds down, and are at the very least concerned about their futures. Most do not seem to have alternative employment options or plans. There was even evidence to suggest that some may even be

sabotaging the completion of the programme in order to retain their employment for as long as possible (GPG, 1999a).

4) Information sharing and withholding

It was quipped, “we have a generation of politicians who are good at taking flack but who have not been good at taking credit or making capital out of the success of the project” (Interview: KSIPP strategic consultant, 2003). Indeed, the KSIPP deliberately curtailed its budget and thus programmes of communication believing that it was important to be delivering rather than talking. The cost of this approach is layperson ignorance of the project outcomes. In focus group interviews ordinary community members expressed suspicion about the funds that were spent, suggesting that monies were ‘eaten’ by developers and that they were not targeted at the general population (Interview: Focus group (c), 2003). On enquiry it emerged that people indeed benefited from improved and new health facilities, schools and engineering services. These were not, however, identified as KSIPP inputs.

Another interesting twist that resulted from inadequate information sharing was that people referred to the KSIPP and the RDP as the same initiative. This is problematic, as the RDP had colloquially become the term for subsidised housing of the new government. This housing is in many instances surrounded with concerns of poor quality, corruption and problematic allocation. Technically, the KSIPP did not deliver housing as its funding excluded housing delivery. It facilitated the concurrent development of so-called RDP housing as one of its functions but this was not really the central thrust of the initiative. One of the members of an action area committee [the local level participatory structures] remarked that while she went to all the meetings she often did not understand the language and could not give effective feedback to her neighbourhood.

5) Inclusion and exclusion – power and alienation

The RDP approach focused on the building of capacity within local government to execute urban renewal functions. In this the KSIPP is an exception. Although aspects of the KSIPP can be argued to have built local government capacity, whether through the involvement of officials in consultative processes or through the direct implementation of services and products by local government, the KSIPP was the one

SiPP project that was consultant driven in its management. The private sector consultant driven model does not overtly promote high levels of participation. There is a tension between professional agents wanting to deliver projects and the resources required to empower community networks for decision-making. These are often viewed as ‘distractions from direct delivery’. Intense interactions between the consultants and the local authorities in Kathorus tended to marginalise NGOs. Even as projects grapple with inclusion, they simultaneously, in a more or less systematic fashion, exclude. Given the history of the transition, where popular movements were sidelined in the restructuring of a new state; it is not surprising that the civic movement, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO) felt itself so excluded within Kathorus. Interviews with residents’ groups and with SANCO revealed strong perceptions of alienation from KSiPP processes. There was also confusion over many project details and certainly a lack of clarity around responsibility.

In terms of alienation, SANCO representatives complained that emerging contractors were not involved in the Thokoza stadium: they only got to prepare roads; that SANCO was not consulted on projects; that action area committees and mayors took decisions without SANCO; that warlords were given projects to focus their minds, but they were not skilled in building; and that projects in some areas were given to contractors who lived in different zones. The last-mentioned, parochial concern demonstrates a lingering rivalry in the area in spite of peace efforts (Interview: Focus group (d), 1999).

Councillors similarly complained of being excluded from decision-making by officials and consultants. They in particular recalled that the ordering of priorities was not agreed by them: “People were angry because the hostel projects started before the damaged housing projects” (Interview: Focus group (a), 2003).

Power of Individual Personalities

The role of individual personalities within the project cannot be discounted. Who the project champions were is important because so much of the activity and process that took place relied on strategising in the moment or on finding a way to deliver a project or negotiate through contentious issues without the guidance of policy or

formal planning tools. A brief description of the key personalities involved in the KSiPP is provided below:

The KTG chairperson, a man who had risen through the ranks of the apartheid defence force in the height of the state's strongest campaigns of repression, and a man who – even when being interviewed for the evaluation of this project – carried a gun strapped to his ankle, took to the leadership role of chairing the KTG with immense energy. The KSiPP strategic consultant – strategic consultant to the KSiPP – would later say, “(The chairperson of the KTG) was smart, energetic and understood government systems and how to maximise the outcomes from them. He got buy-in from the steering committee. He personally identified with the project” (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999). This latter point is borne out by the chairperson's comment, “I had three personal points of departure on this project: We must not waste money. We must avoid politics. There must be no media coverage for personalities” (Interview: KTG chairperson, 1999). He was adamant that the ‘RDP money’ was precious and should not be wasted. He cut his own salary by one third to set an example of not wasting funds. The KTG started with few resources, “We bummed the office, the furniture, etc. and mostly I worked from the boot of my car... “ The chairperson felt that a personal encounter with American military where he was convinced of the approach of project managing a process and then handing it back to the state helped him to believe in the approach and to have the confidence to take charge of it. While he was given “clear guidelines” to "develop the infrastructure, make peace, get people back into their homes, ensure good governance” (Interview: KTG chairperson, 1999), the major concern for the KTG was to ensure peaceful elections.

The political representative to the KSiPP, an ANC member of parliament (MP) and at that time a recent returnee to South Africa from years of exile, was given responsibility for the project at a political level, being appointed by the new provincial legislature. He came to embody the disorganisation of the early days when a provincial state finding its feet was faced with managing this sizeable intervention. The Gauteng chief director: housing notes,

The department announced an enormous project without thinking through the financing or management. There was no proper control and no communication between the legislature

and officials on the project. The project management was considered to be ‘a disaster’. (Interview, 1999)

A highly charismatic member of the KTG worth discussing for his remarkable impact on the project was the **representative of the trade union movement**. He was a local resident and longstanding activist and the person who made the call to a leading Johannesburg development consultant and asked for assistance in preparing an application for a Reconstruction and Development project in Kathorus. This figure would later become a MP and then mayor of the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Council.

At government level the key official charged with effecting the KSiPP was the **provincial housing chief director**. He was the accountable official and the channel at the bureaucratic level for all documentation, payments and for information flows between national, provincial and local government. A longstanding government employee, the chief director had worked in the Department of Water Affairs before joining the housing department of the provincial government in 1991. There he had worked on effecting subsidised housing projects under the late-apartheid state. He was a likeable, efficient and patriarchal manager within his own units, an official steeped in the policy and programmatic processes of state bureaucracy. He was referred to as a “seasoned official” (Interview: SiPPs manager, national Housing Department, 1999) and as “useful – he understands the government processes, he can bend any rule, he can bypass any system” (Interview: KSiPP project manager, 1999). Critical to the project, the chief director could get speedy decision-making through the state bureaucracy.

The project manager held overall responsibility for the project. He reported on a regular basis to all spheres of government, particularly local government, both formally and informally. As a politically appointed official he had direct access to the provincial housing member of the executive council (MEC) and via him to key political powers at provincial and if necessary national level. He also managed troubleshooting and conflict resolution and provided overall strategic direction and focus to the project.

The project manager, who was a final year school student in the then Northern Transvaal at the time of the 1976 youth uprisings, was politically active in student, youth, civic and underground political structures from that time. His first academic encounter with university [in Zululand] fell victim to his political activity and to several periods of detention by the state. He returned to the north to pursue activism amongst civic groupings and would later study at the University of the North [where the said MEC was a fellow student and friend] and in the early 1990s would complete a Masters degree in Development Planning at the University of the Witwatersrand. This latter learning in development set the KSiPP project manager aside from many activist officials. He readily understood development language, he engaged in technical detail, provided input and questioned decisions. Furthermore, he was able to explain the project interventions to politicians and community leadership in technical terms where this was required, or in political terms where that was called for. His political history enabled him to make the strategic judgement call on the representation he applied.

Of this avuncular, shrewd, activist-cum-development specialist other team members said:

Generally, politicians and NGOs hated this white team of consultants [KSiPP project team]. (The project manager) got a lot of flack but generally stood by the team as he established himself as a political broker within the community. A number of compromises had to be sealed, he sealed them and each functional manager then had to bear the consequences. (Interview: KSiPP social services coordinator, 1998)

(The project manager) did so many logical things, he's a genius. He looked after the KTG people. He got them 'planted' in local government, to help the process. Councils were suspicious, they thought the RDP was building an empire. At the end of the KTG there was an effort to get jobs for people who had worked in the structure. (Interview: KTG chairperson, 1999)

(The project manager) was a key buffer and link between the technocrats and the politicians. He had credibility and was shrewd. He is also a survivor. (Interview: KSiPP strategic consultant, 1999)

(The project manager) is streetwise. He understands the local communities and has a well-heelled political history. He also has the technical and professional skills to understand the job at

hand. People tend to trust him... (Interview: chief director: housing, 1999)

His management style is tough in the office. Here he is bad at managing people and good at resolving issues. But I think he got exhausted or lost interest at some point. (Interview: KSiPP administrator, 1998)

A project office was established and the secretariat operated out of this office. The office performed administrative functions and acted as a point of direct liaison with community members. Staff drawn from the Peace Secretariat assisted the project manager. The key person in the secretariat was a feisty, tireless **administrator** who managed the office, had hands-on experience of peace interventions. She talked of days and nights of negotiation, of monitoring and of horrific encounters in her work with the peace structures through the two years preceding the project. This administrator recounted tales of helping, shielding, mediating and of such hideous experiences as carrying bodies out of the line of fire, of finding a dead infant on a rubbish heap and of rescuing wounded youth (Interview: KSiPP administrator, 1998). Two community liaison officers worked within the secretariat. These were young men drawn from paramilitary structures of political structures in the area, the ANC Special Defence Unit (SDU) and the IFP Special Protection Unit (SPU). They monitored the townships daily and fed back concerns on projects, likely tensions and news to the project manager. They also fed project information into the community on an informal basis.

The **project team** was responsible for ensuring the implementation of the project. The consultants were expected to supervise, monitor, coordinate, facilitate and in some cases, implement the project.

The project team leader, a planner and housing specialist, oversaw the activities of the project team members. His tasks included:

- ▶ reviewing all business plans and project proposals received and submitting them for approval to provincial government;
- ▶ administering and consolidating all invoices and making all payments to project team members;
- ▶ coordinating the activities of all team members;

- ▶ making proposals as to the overall strategic focus of the project; and
- ▶ ensuring the effective and continued implementation of the project in terms of the agreed business plans.

But he also played a major role in ‘smoothing the waters’ between members of the professional team. The security and social professionals often clashed on matters of principle and priority and the team leader would engage them individually and help to find a workable solution. In this he was constantly guided by a need to deliver. The KSiPP social services coordinator (Interview, 1998), noted that the team leader “would listen to (my) concerns and then say... now what can we do to get the project back on the road?”

The project team leader had a track record in housing policy development, land and low-income housing research, housing finance and particularly the development of employer housing policy and project proposals. He had worked at the Urban Foundation in the early 1980s. His understanding of the housing arena at a policy and project level was extremely solid. As a project leader he was known for his persistence and his calm manner. He said of his own work that he kept his ‘eye on the ball’ and when probed said that the ball was the need to deliver, to show action by getting projects on the ground. The KSiPP strategic consultant said: “(The project team leader) was good: he kept working at relationships with government. He was patient and tireless about smoothing the cracks in relationships, and he is inherently conflict avoiding” (Interview, 1999).

Less afraid of conflict was the self-assured, somewhat authoritarian **strategic consultant**. With his experience at senior management level of the Urban Foundation and his chairmanship of the NHF this consultant was a scoop for the Kathorus project. His clear thinking, his ability to sort priorities, to make judgement calls ‘on his feet’ on what would win political and official support as well as his capacity for conceptualising processes made him a fine strategic leader in the confused, anxious start of the planning process. He is undoubtedly the author of the strategic framework and with his history in Johannesburg development circles, he easily won the respect and following of the technical consultants. This consultant is known for taking calculated risks, for his commitment to a liberal development paradigm, which he

believes and promotes above political ideology. Officials often found him brash and even dismissive and it fell to the project team leader or project manager to appease them in the execution of ideas led by the strategic consultant.

Five functional coordinators reported to the project team leader, each responsible for a different aspect of the project. The team reflects the blend of personalities old and new order typical of early 1990s development arenas:

- ▶ The security functional area was headed by a former colonel in the South African Defence Force.
- ▶ The engineering services functional area was led by a consultant within an engineering consulting firm that had worked on behalf of provincial government in the development of infrastructure for new black settlements in the late apartheid years.
- ▶ The social services [health, welfare and education] functional area was managed by a social worker grounded in education and NGO project work.
- ▶ The sport, recreation and business area was headed by a development consultant who was an ex-Urban Foundation employee and entrepreneur with a social development flair.
- ▶ The housing functional area was managed by the project team leader.
- ▶ A former Urban Foundation employee and media consultant managed the communication functional area.

Each functional coordinator was responsible for facilitating the implementation of projects in his or her functional area. Functional coordinators were not required to implement projects themselves, rather they were required to coordinate with all relevant stakeholders in their functional areas to identify the projects that should be undertaken and then identify appropriate implementers for each project. Increasingly this role was about managing individual projects rather than strategic oversight of the ‘functional area’ in the townships. Given the short-term nature of the intervention, each project was implemented with the intention of completion and viability in its own right. The role of these functional coordinators as project champions was critical to the success of the project and was commended in the 1999 post-project evaluation (GPG, 1999b):

- ▶ “(The social services consultant) could get people to do anything, without her commitment to relationship building, the projects would have failed”;

- ▶ “(The security coordinator) went out there and did the work of engineers, of tour operators, all because he was determined to get the security projects going”;
- ▶ “(The team leader’s) continued focus on the goal kept projects on track”;
- ▶ “(The engineering coordinator) came into the project at a disadvantage – he had not been the preferred engineer for the job at first – but he outperformed all portfolios in management and delivery”;
- ▶ “(The sport and recreation consultant) spent night after night in the area, negotiating details of the sports facilities way beyond the confines of the project”;
- ▶ “(The economic development consultant) geared up enormous sums of money beyond the project budget.”

Power and Rationality in Political and Technical Approaches

Alarming, the project manager was strident and cynical in his capturing of the overall approach in the KSiPP. When asked what the planning approach was, he repeatedly expressed that, “It was a militaristic intervention: suppress, spread propaganda and manipulate” (Interviews: KSiPP project manager, 1999, 2003). This may well relate to his particular role in the project as elaborated below, even though military symbolism was not absent in other perceptions of the strategy. The KTG chairperson, for example, stated in his praise of the energy and focus of the consultant drive approach,

There is a principle in war that you put the maximum firepower in the front. We did that with our delivery and our consultants. The consultants were a tenacious bunch. They had all faced these guys (local councils, community, and province) before. (Interview, 1999)

These notions are strongly contrasted by the consultant team leader’s technicist framing of the interventions as describe within the outcomes section of this chapter. It is the overt foregrounding of both the technical and the political approaches within management that is the most striking feature of Kathorus management. Its unusualness is highlighted by Rapoo: “... implementing development policy is a political as well as a technical exercise, since it affects the interests of social groups; this poses a constraint on delivery that is rarely if ever mentioned in government planning” (1996:15). Both concerns are seldom included in as blatant a manner or accorded such equal status as they were in the KSiPP where two project heads were

appointed, one political (project manager) and the other technical (consultant team leader).

The conscious and upfront recognition of the need to accommodate both political and technical aspects at the highest levels of project management allowed the tension between the technical and political to be managed in tandem while allowing each to be dealt with immediately. If there had been delays in political action or engagement with the community when project tensions arose in this volatile area, the project could have been flung into crisis.

The foregrounding of the political and technical arms of the KSiPP was part of the overall strategy and serves to highlight a dynamic relationship between power and rationality. The links were blurred by project imperatives and it is not clear that the two sides always interacted with one another. There was a sense that at times the technical issues were split from political concerns and that the project manager dealt with politics and freed the consultant team leader to get on with delivery in an apolitical way.

At times the technical and at other times the political have for instance been used to explain why participation was limited in the project. In technical terms the KSiPP consultant team leader explains: “We detailed the development projects technically. We did not canvas the views of the community on what the development challenges were” (Interview, 2003). Here the immediate link between a technicist approach and a non-participative approach is stark.

An interesting irony in the interplay between power and rationality is evidenced in the consultant team leader’s comparison between implementing the Kathorus Project in the mid-1990s, early transition years and the implementation of the Alexandra Urban Renewal Project ten years into democratic governance. His comments suggest that the period of consolidated power provides less manoeuvrability:

When we operated in the early 1990s things were much more fluid than they are now. So the plan had to be more robust. A simple plan was good. In Alex we have a more complacent political situation. Things are not about to fall apart. Procedurally government is more fixed and the accountability

that goes with government is in place. But in Kathorus we were bolder because things weren't in place. In Alex we are not sure of our backs. There are political battles in the state departments. We can't always be sure of our support in a department... (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002)

These comments resonate with Flyvbjerg's thesis on the relationship between power and rationality. In particular it points to Flyvbjerg's assertion of the asymmetrical relationship between power and rationality, in which power will always dominate and his fourth proposition that states that "the greater the power, the less the rationality" (Flyvbjerg, 1998b:229).

Rationality

This section analyses the rationalities and rationalisations that prevailed in the KSiPP. In particular it examines the overarching framework for the project, the dominance of technicist rationality, the battle for other, social rationalities to establish a footing and the presence of competing rationalities in the implementation processes.

Framing Strategy: Getting Buy In through Technical 'Simplicity'

The KSiPP consultants and officials interviewed did not readily recall a 'planning approach' or overall strategy. With hindsight they were more aware of many discreet projects and an overarching concern with ensuring stability. They were however certain that their projects fitted within a broad framework of dealing with emergency tasks first and with rebuilding and new building projects at a later stage. This crude breakdown of 'process' is outlined in the overall business plan developed in 1994. It confirms that the implementation strategy that was established at the outset was broad. This strategy was in fact never articulated in a refined or detailed manner.

The plan was a technically rational phasing approach that was deliberately simple. It was developed within a rationality that was premised on satisfying and on translating the manifold concerns in a complex environment into a comprehensible technical picture. Of the four point plan the KSiPP strategic consultant said,

The implementation proposal was based on the development model of a ladder of development. This was then translated into a series of programmes, which were quantified, and broad scale

budgets were produced for them. The RDP at the time was floundering about for ideas... they bought in. (Interview, 1999)

He said that a complicated programme would be too sophisticated for the community in the administrative chaos as it was then. What was required was a plan that focused on manageable, focused programmes.

The team leader saw the four-phase plan – emergency input, repair, upgrading and new development (outlined in Chapter Six) – and the overall development programme as “the organising device”. He added,

The guts (sic) of the plan was the four phases. This was our rational planning approach. There is a lot of (the strategic consultant) in this strategy. [The strategic consultant] forces you to be explicit and structured and he pushes it even if you aren't actually happy with it. He will push you to the limit to get content. What happens is that even if the answers aren't all right, they mostly are.” (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002)

He found the organising device to be both strategic and flexible and said that by comparison this was a simple, clear approach, “... other SiPPs projects were more rigid, more programmatic... The approach was very robust. Overall, when things got difficult this simple approach was our touchstone” (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002).

In reality the plan was of course neither simple nor above reproach. The preceding sections on outcome and power have illuminated the realities of implementation, which were as political as they were technical. Furthermore, the technical language of the plan excludes references to the political dynamics at institutional and community level that bedevilled planning. It does not acknowledge the sometimes partisan approaches followed or the biased choices that would be made in pursuing assumed pragmatic planning as discussed in the ethics section of this chapter.

The logical, sequential, rational approach of outcomes-based planning that was cascaded through business plans was becoming an accepted method in the national management of resource allocation. The ordering devices of such plans were prevalent across the development spectrum in the new state, and were a base requirement for funding allocation. In practice, the overall KSiPP plan was not often

referred to. The project's own assessment of its lessons learnt is uneven in its documenting of the project goals per functional area. It does not measure the success or otherwise of projects or of functional areas against these goals (GPG, 1999b). The simple, broad approach proved to be useful to project managers. It was simple and flexible enough to accommodate changes in priorities over the life of the project [and allowed, for instance, for large extensions to the housing budget for violence-damaged housing, without reference to original goals]. It was above all useful for legitimising the process and for fulfilling the funding requirement of business-plan development. The consultants believed that they didn't act against the plan but the plan was so broad that they had freedom for lots of action in response to circumstances on the ground. The plan was a framework for staging inputs, but it did not curtail the managers in acting according to the rationality that prevailed at a given time.

Multiple Rationalities

While little evidence of debate in the pre-planning era is documented, the broad lines of competing discourses around development were contained in the emerging policy of the time. Tensions such as those between the discourses of growth and development as evident in the RDP and in national economic policy; policies around the alleviation of inequality and poverty; and housing concerns for integrated development versus delivery at scale were not unknown to the architects of the October 1994 plan for Kathorus. Rather the indication in quotations outlined above is that the technicist rationality that prevailed in the document was a concerted, conscious choice. The so-called political demands of the crisis in Kathorus were quickly translated into technical concerns that could be tackled through a logical, rational framework. In describing the first planning process, the team leader says,

This was worked out by the technical team. We went into an eight-week planning process with a list of 'political interventions'. In our technical sub areas we all had to think about the logic of the planning phases. (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader 1999)

In the KSiPP planning was framed in a technicist rationality that focused almost immediately on the translation of the ambitious objectives into measurable, often physical, outcomes. Through the project life this would result in concerns for long-term social development, psychological interventions to deal with trauma, poverty alleviation programmes and economic development taking a back seat. Through the

power of this outcomes-based discourse ‘hard services’ readily won the competing rationalities of rapid, physical development versus longer-term strategic planning.

To the extent that there were non-spatial goals in the first business plan, these focused on security. This is the most spoken of objective and was in many senses the *raison d’etre* of the KSiPP. It also became the rationalisation for many actions. The extension of this rationalisation of planning to effect stability blurred the lines of participation and maintenance of security. Early reports show that securing community support was seen as a security issue (a throw back to the hearts and minds approach of security forces in the 1980s). The rhetoric of ‘stabilising the area’ came to rationalise many planning actions in Kathorus.

The consequence of an overtly technical rationality was that many of the a spatial issues in Kathorus were not dealt with or, as in the case of economic development, were handled outside of the funding framework of the KSiPP. This does not mean that a spatial concerns were entirely absent from the debates and development tensions through the project. Rather, a social development rationality continued to butt against the technical rationality. This was particularly prevalent in the perception of social services evident in interviews conducted for project evaluations. Social services were spoken of as ‘nice to have’ services; institutionalising social workers at local government level was extremely difficult and met with animosity despite the obvious social crisis of the area. It took years of concerted effort and the evidence of implemented social service projects (including the physical interventions such as libraries and the impact of council-based social workers) for council officials to acknowledge the centrality of these interventions (GPG, 1999a).

Several themes that were emerging within national policy (such as spatial integration) bypassed the Kathorus Project. At a conceptual level, many themes surrounded the project activity. These often served more as rhetoric in project applications than as concepts that filtered through the project activity. While terms such as integration, sustainability, community empowerment and bias to the poor were contained in the key frameworks that surrounded the KSiPP, the project itself confined its rhetoric to action oriented-speak.

The technical rationality that governed the project was fuelled by a projects-driven approach. It did not translate into an elevation of spatial planning. The concept of spatial integration was not important in the execution of the project. In fact spatial planning was at best an afterthought in the KSiPP and a spatial plan emerged only within the housing portfolio a few years into the project. While improved roads and overall stability improved the linkages between these areas and neighbouring white areas, specific strategies to cross spatial divides were not developed. A rationality of urgency overrode concerns with integration and quickly evoked a sense that the KSiPP was tackling the most important, most urgent problems. The rationalisation was that, given the immediate physical crisis of the area, efforts were focused on rehabilitation and new development in the confines of the three townships. The team leader however, explains the approach in terms of a personal, pragmatic value system:

We certainly used the physical context to place developments. But it was a strange process, and unlike Alex [a reference to a later urban renewal project in the dense township of Alexandra]. We did not use a conventional physical planning process. Many interventions in Kathorus were not taking place in terms of a physical structure plan. Many of the other SiPPs projects were driven by an initial extensive planning process. We were driven by a delivery impetus. That comes from the character of the people involved. (The provincial housing chief director; the project manager) and myself. We are people who get the job done. So we had a satisfying process rather than a comprehensive plan. (Interview: KSiPP consultant team leader, 2002)

The need for immediate action brought to a head the competition between rationalities of longer-term strategic development and immediate technically driven development. In this tension the discourses of more strategic planning were sometimes viewed as mere rhetoric and there is little evidence of extensive debate around them. There was even a view that the discourse of integration conflicted with the ‘reality’ of need and moreover with a community value system. The Alberton RDP manager noted,

People talked of the compact city and said we needed to change our planning. But the reality on the ground is that we had people living there who needed houses. You also can’t go against the market. Few people could afford to move out of the township. So you couldn’t have integration. You also faced the battle of the compact city vs. what people wanted – one man one plot... (Interview, 2003)

These competing rationalities in the KSiPP reflected a national discourse of delivery. It was a discourse that would soon shift. Chipkin (2002a) distinguishes between the delivery focused 'RDP approach' to development and the more facilitative and strategic 'integrated development approach', where the former was the hallmark of the 1994 RDP and also features in the Urban Development strategy of 1995, while the latter approach appears in the White Paper on Local Government (1997). He notes that in the RDP framing of development "residents became citizens when their needs were satisfied; where needs were defined, essentially, as a house and a serviced site" (Chipkin, 2002a:4). Serviced delivery then is an end in itself. This is in line with formulations of development and of developmental local government that are found in the Urban Development Strategy of 1995, where the primary role of local governments is defined as service delivery. It is a formulation of development that is contradicted by the White Paper on Local Government of 1997 where, Chipkin (2002a) notes, service delivery is not even mentioned as a function of local government. Rather, developmental local government is defined in terms of municipalities working with citizens and groups to find sustainable means of meeting their social, economic and material needs. A significant shift is thus made between the RDP approach that is focused on delivery as an outcome and the 'developmental local government' approach that views the products of delivery (houses, services etc.) only as development if they also contribute to the goals of 'sustainability'. (These goals are not defined in the White Paper, but presumably include such measures as improvement of economic or social conditions.) This shift is indicative of the general policy shift in the 1990s away from a spatial orientation towards a focus on governance (Parnell and Pieterse, 2002). While the KSiPP was not blinded to developmental concerns in the process of delivery, as it paid attention to process issues and participation, its paramount focus was on delivery of a range of services and products, firmly in line with the original RDP conception of development (see also Pillay, Tomlinson and du Toit, 2006). Measures applied in business plans and in progress reports were primarily concerned with quantitative indicators of delivery.

Ethics: “I am not Convinced we Always Addressed the Real Needs”

The value-laden nature of supposedly technical choices made in the KSiPP has been explored in the section on rationality above. This section focuses in particular on the question of justice as the pertinent ethical question in the South African context. It analyses this issue within the prominent repair to violence-damaged housing projects as well as in the limited attention paid to hostel projects.

Project Choice: Expedience over Justice

The choice of projects was sometimes driven by political expediency or by finding the line of least resistance. An official interviewed in 2003, acknowledged that, “we concentrated on tackling the things we could agree on” (Interview: Alberton housing official, 1999). The October 1994 business plan is unapologetic about project selection, stating that

(T)hese actions are not necessarily the most important nor those which focus on the biggest problems, but they are actions which can happen immediately, have a high chance of success and will make an impact on improving people’s daily lives. (KSPP, 1994a:17).

In South Africa notions of justice are closely linked with concerns around poverty, as poverty of exclusion from access to resources of all kinds is the basis of the injustice that built apartheid. Consequently, a focus on the poor overshadowed and united much of the complex development debate in South Africa in the early 1990s. This concept was also rooted in the international discourse. Arguably the broad based interventions such as the upgrading of engineering services touched the lives of most Kathorus residents and would have impacted upon the poor. The upgrading of informal settlements and minimal improvements to hostel environments were directed at the most marginal of the population. But limited poverty relief programmes were applied and the prioritisation of projects did not have a specifically pro-poor bias. In fact in creating high profile projects such as the ‘Repair to Violence-Damage Houses’ it is the wealthier sectors of the community who benefited most.

The case study of violence-damaged housing is pertinent in the examination of questions of ethical motivation in the KSiPP. Evaluations confirmed that the KSiPP did not have social justice as a guiding principle (GPG, 1999a) and that priorities of

political imperative, visibility and quick delivery dominated. This raised the question of why a SIPP, which is essentially about the redistribution of resources to communities in a very strategic way, is not guided by the notion of a just, equitable or fair distributionary outcome. Evaluations found that the housing repairs programme, for example, enabled some beneficiaries to access quite substantial levels of state subsidy, sometimes in the region of R120,000 in value. This seems unfair in a context where many people are considered to be homeless. The funding for the programme could have been used very differently to house far more people. Yet a very powerful response to this position, articulated by officials and community representatives alike, has been that the reparations made to victims of violence in the form of repaired houses was in itself fair and just, beyond any consideration of whether or not other groups of people deserving of state support benefited.

Furthermore, the programme involved several moral hazards. In addition to the expense and questionable justice of the repair to violence-damaged housing, the moral hazards of the programme were raised in evaluations. It was found that the programme 'encouraged' people to make false claims for repairs. In some cases people in damaged houses borrowed doors and window frames from others. Others claimed for stoves or cupboards that they may not have had originally, or deliberately damaged their old ceilings or roofs to obtain new replacements. It was difficult for assessors to establish whether someone making a claim for such materials had a legitimate claim to replace them, or if they were merely taking a chance to obtain new ones. There were also examples cited of contractors stealing building materials, building material concessionaries inflating prices; and thefts from building sites. The patent lack of integrity of professionals who benefited from this project (Interview: KSIPP strategic consultant, 1999) raises further moral questions.

There are several other ways in which socially just distributionary outcomes have not been facilitated by the SIPP. The limited funding for hostel upgrading is particularly unjust in the sense that hostel residents are amongst the poorest and most marginalised of Kathorus residents, and yet they received the least support from the SIPP. A powerful comment was made by a hostel resident present at the focus group held in Thokoza, "It is sad to attend this meeting as if we were included in the project, when nothing was done in the hostels" (Interview: Focus group (c) , 2003). The sense that

hostels were neglected in the project is rife in community responses. In the same focus group it was noted that “Nothing was done for the hostels by the RDP” and “The RDP was only for the township”.

The roles and rights of stakeholders in the development process were defined in imprecise ways in state policy in the 1990s. For the purposes of examining the ethical issues surrounding development choices in the KSiPP it is instructive to note Chipkin’s (2002a) reading of this notion in the RDP. There it is implied that stakeholders become citizens when they are able to exercise their rights to a house and serviced stand. This approach places the responsibility for delivery at the door of the state. It contrasts a later formulation of citizenship in the 1997 Urban Development Strategy where it is implied that residents become citizens to the extent that they are able to access the resources that enable them to reproduce themselves socially and materially. Chipkin notes too the hidden implication that “the figure of the citizen is also an ethical character; it is someone who conducts herself ‘rightfully’ and sustains herself in and through activities deemed virtuous by the state” (Chipkin, 2002a:8-9). These notions of citizenship have impacted on development approaches and Chipkin examines the theoretical norms inherent in the state’s intentions to produce citizens through its resource allocation and to ensure that residents behave as citizens in the way that they reproduce themselves socially and economically. He finds little evidence that the delivery of state services such as health, housing and community services has achieved this goal. His study of Manenberg focuses on the slippage between the assumptions that the delivery of community services will produce the conditions for good citizenship (defined against an imprecise array of family and ethical norms) to develop, and the reality of such delivery in the Cape Town context. The KSiPP laboured less under an overt pressure to cast development in terms of sustainability or citizenship objectives than under sheer pressure for delivery. More central was the RDP-type definition of the citizen as having rights to access state provided services. The KSiPP tended towards this attitude of paternalistic decision-making where the responsibility for delivery choices was seated with the state and its agents.

Masking of Ethical Concerns in Technical Rationality

The evaluative measures of engineering services also tend towards technical rationality, focusing on business plan requirements and scales of performance. They do not readily address value-laden issues of spread of services against highest need or value for money. The fact that they use value for money in this area of extreme poverty and context of high need takes an interesting political turn, where high level services are argued as a political necessity, to bring the area in line with neighbouring white areas. Later reports would show that the unintended consequence of these decisions was low levels of affordability for services and high levels of non-payment. A Masakhane Campaign was launched in Kathorus during the KSiPP to encourage residents to pay monthly service charges. This campaign had very limited success as reported in the 1999 evaluation thereof (GPG, 1999a). The actual payments for services in the three areas that comprise Kathorus continue to fall far short of the budgeted revenues for these areas.

Furthermore, there is an inaccurate façade of incontrovertibility in the nature of engineering services: a façade of a technical rationality, of technical issues being too complicated for lay people to question, of a functional area that could be trusted to deliver because there was history of capacity. At this level it resembled a straight forward process with little debate or balance of choices. It pushed efficiency, but the consultants were paid well, they also benefited from other projects, such the technical aspects of housing design. This was controversial and never raised in the KSiPP's own performance reports or evaluations. In service design, the possibility for innovation was not raised. Alternative serving standards or types of infrastructure were not considered.

Overall, in terms of the rightness or otherwise of choices in the KSiPP, the chief director's concerns at the conclusion of the project are pertinent. He stated, "We had lots of fancy ideas, but I am not convinced we always addressed the real needs..." (Interview: Gauteng chief director: housing, 1999).

Spatial Justice

It has been noted earlier in this chapter that the KSiPP did not address apartheid city form. A further discussion of this issue in terms of justice is instructive. The apartheid

city imposed discrimination on people classified as other than white in all aspects of life. It entrenched these through residential segregation in the form of townships, which were characterised by inferior housing, community facilities and infrastructural services, and poor location with respect to job opportunities. Smith (2003) shows that apartheid demonstrated the force of Iris Young's five faces of oppression, namely exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism and violence (after Young, 1990). Migrancy and spatial separation that attended the apartheid city lowered the cost of African labour and facilitated exploitation. The peripheral location of townships entrenched marginalisation, while the obviously separate and deprived areas set aside for blacks as well as the denial of the franchise enforced powerlessness. Cultural imperialism was apparent in the domination of white lifestyles and values, expressed in cultural celebration, physical form and architecture of towns, while other cultures were portrayed as exotic. Finally, violence was manifest in daily social control and harsh living conditions experienced by black South Africans (Smith, 2003:29).

Smith and others (Davies, 1981; Simon, 1989; Smith, 2003) projected that the apartheid city form would remain largely intact with changes around the edges in terms of racially mixed 'grey' areas and an increase in informal urbanisation as the occupation of open land would become more difficult than under apartheid. With the broad patterns of property values and affordability not shifting significantly, improvements in township areas would be minimal. What was likely was that a racial apartheid would be replaced by a 'deracialised apartheid' as class divisions replaced racial divisions and the poor remained marginalised. How close reality has come to these visions is explored by several authors (including Todes, 2006; Pillay, Tomlinson and du Toit, 2006) who have focused on the issue of integration of South African cities and others who have been concerned with the extent of service delivery to poor South Africans or the lack of improvement in townships (Bond, 2003; Mayekiso, 2003; Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell, 2002). Smith (2003) contends that the main impact of state policy with respect to addressing the apartheid city in the 1990s has been on service improvements in poor parts of cities. Bond (2003) finds that the "evidence of worsening class apartheid is now even acknowledged in official government" he cites the statistics released by Statistics South Africa in October 2002 that showed that in real terms average black household incomes had declined. Across

racial divides figures indicate a rise in unemployment and a widening gap between levels of affluence and poverty. The apartheid spatial legacy has remained “largely intact” (Smith, 2003:30). Bond (2003) notes that residential desegregation in upper and middle-income areas has taken place relatively smoothly, but that other features of urban life are characterised by even more severe inequality and uneven development than existed pre-1994. In summary, Smith notes that “(T)he challenge of social justice in South African cities continues to loom large, especially for those subscribing to the egalitarian ethics... which underpinned so much of the opposition to apartheid” (2003:31). In Kathorus there was undoubted improvement in service levels and physical conditions within the township. The broader issues of spatial justice were, however, not addressed.

Conclusion

This chapter has analysed the KSiPP against the five lenses of critical pragmatism, namely context, outcomes, rationality, power and ethics. The analysis of the Kathorus story conducted in this and previous chapters places the study of the project within a spatial, political and historical context. Furthermore, it examines the actions of the planners within the context of the powers of the institutions, the varied client communities and the planners themselves in the era that the project was set. This context is shown to have impacted critically on planning, implementation and the outcomes of the project. It framed the opportunity as well as the limitations for intervention.

In terms of outcomes, the Kathorus story reflects above all else an impressive delivery record. While this record is nuanced with questions of who benefited, how decisions were taken and what socio-political and historical factors enabled the project to take the course that it did, there is, nevertheless, an unquestionable record of fast tracked delivery of resources and of substantial physical improvement in an area of extreme need. In this regard the single-minded focus on outcomes has been shown to be important in its own right.

Interests and seats of power were important in Kathorus where political power was contested, institutional power divided and a multitude of interests existed. The

planning process responded to and was consciously manipulated by these powers. Planning was both a tool in these power struggles and exercised its own ‘dark’ powers of manipulation in a collaborative approach. In Kathorus the participatory approach was selective. This in spite of the participatory tropes that were upheld in early documentation and planning frameworks for the study. It will be shown that participation leaned towards being ‘sufficient’ for moving the project forward – in some instances this was even cynically applied – rather than being a goal in its own right in the planning process. The emphasis on action overrode traditional participatory aims such as citizen empowerment or democratisation. The sectoral nature of participation necessarily drew out some members of the ‘community’ for engagement in project deliberations and not others. An examination of who participated and how this engagement with the project affected power relations is relevant to this planning process that straddled action-centeredness and at least a rhetorical commitment to participatory approaches.

The overarching technical rationality of planning processes in Kathorus masks the multiple rationalities and the tensions between competing rationalities. This analysis sheds light on the dynamics behind the apparently uncontested terrain of rationality in the project. Finally, the chapter exposes the poor considerations of ethical questions in the KSiPP. An analysis of a key intervention shows it to have been less than just and to have contained key moral hazards.

How these findings resonate with the theoretical concerns of critical pragmatism will be explored in the following chapter.